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Polarization is increasing in American politics and frequently involves 
disagreement over basic facts. Although this phenomenon is rare, the domain of social 
and political issues provides an environment where emotions may influence opinions 
and decisions in seemingly irrational ways. This research explores how individuals 
judge and respond to evidence about controversial socio-political issues, considering 
whether behavior is more appropriately modeled by accounts of motivated reasoning or 
Bayesian updating rules. 
 xii 
We find evidence of an attitude congruency bias, where people judge information 
to be of higher quality when it aligns with their existing attitudes on an issue. However, 
we find that this bias does not necessarily lead to polarizing. Instead, people’s change 
in attitudes is better described by Bayesian updating, where people are sensitive to the 
amount and quality of information they are presented with. This behavior does not seem 
to be driven by affect or knowledge in a domain. 
Judgment of information, in the form of argument rating, was analyzed by 
creating separate measures of objective argument quality and individual rating bias. 
Both factors were found to model attitude change, indicating that participants are 
sensitive to both the objective quality of evidence and to the effects of their own biases. 
Accounts of Bayesian information processing and motivated reasoning both predict 
behavior when information is modeled in terms of these two factors. 
Finally, this research explores the role of information choice and shows that a 
bias toward choosing attitude-congruent information may lead to motivated attitude 
change, where exposure to a biased set of evidence models attitude change in line with 
one’s existing views. People exhibit more sensitivity to information quality when they do 
not choose which information to view, indicating that choice may play a special role in 
allowing individual bias to outweigh information quality. These findings inspire questions 
about the role of curated information and people’s capacity for rational behavior in a 
tense political climate. 
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Chapter 1 
Rational models of attitude change for social issues 
 
Polarization seems to be increasing in American politics (Alwin & Tufis, 2016; 
Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz, 2006), and frequently involves disagreement over basic 
facts (Kahan, 2016). For example, in a survey of American voters, 75% of self-identified 
liberals believed that climate change was due primarily to human activity, whereas only 
45% of conservatives shared this belief (McCright & Dunlap, 2011). Although repeated 
discussion within a group with a strong sense of shared identity can lead individuals to 
hold more extreme attitudes (Sunstein, 2002), polarization is relatively rare (Kahan, 
Peters, Dawson, & Slovic, 2017). Because social and political issues are often where 
cultural identity intersects with factual knowledge, they provide an arena for polarization 
to arise (Kahan, 2016). Here we examine how individuals respond to information 
regarding controversial social issues, exploring whether or not the affectively charged 
nature of these issues compromises a rational response. We consider whether 
polarization on such issues is inevitable, or whether cognitive factors allow consensus 
to emerge. 
Motivated reasoning 
One explanation for polarization on social issues is motivated reasoning (Ditto & 
Lopez, 1992; Kunda, 1990). On such accounts, attitude polarization occurs because 
people with opposing views draw opposite conclusions from the very same evidence. In 
a classic study, Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) queried participants about their views on 
capital punishment, then presented them with the results of two studies: one that 
suggested the death penalty deters crime, and one that suggested the opposite 
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conclusion. Participants were asked to rate the quality of each study, and then to re-
characterize their views on the death penalty. Interestingly, participants tended to rate 
the study that supported their own beliefs as objectively better than the one that 
undermined them, and each group adjusted their beliefs to more strongly favor their 
original position (Lord et al., 1979). According to motivated reasoning, polarization 
occurs because different processes are invoked to evaluate arguments compatible with 
prior beliefs versus those that are incompatible. In particular, participants readily accept 
attitude congruent arguments, while spending more time and mental resources arguing 
against incongruent ones (Edwards & Smith, 1996, Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009). 
There is reason to believe that even if in many instances people learn easily and 
naturally from their environment (see Nisbett & Ross, 1980, Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 
1987), there are situations in which it is difficult to methodically test and revise 
hypotheses because of motivational factors, rather than cognitive limitations. For 
example, if an adult is assessing religious beliefs that have been an integral part of her 
life, it seems unlikely that she will start with a broad set of hypotheses, or even a single 
hypothesis, and then explore the possibilities of abandoning religious faith or seeking 
out new religious beliefs in response to careful consideration of evidence and data. 
Religious beliefs, along with other types of personal beliefs, may function differently 
from hypotheses such as “What happens when I let go of this cup?” because they are 
emotional and may be associated with a person’s sense of self (Kunda, 1990, 
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Individuals may be motivated not to update these 
beliefs in the same way that other beliefs are updated. 
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Dissonant rationalizing 
Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, Wicklund & Brehm, 1976), an 
early theory of motivated reasoning, is one possible framework for understanding 
attitude change. According to this theory, exposure to information contradicting a 
strongly held belief creates cognitive dissonance and a need to reduce or resolve the 
dissonance. The theory proposes that people are motivated to reduce dissonance just 
as we are motivated to eat: the more hungry people are, the more they seek out food. 
Similarly, the more cognitive dissonance people experience, the more they will seek to 
resolve that dissonance. People can resolve dissonance by seeking out belief-
confirming information, changing their mind, or adopting additional thoughts to resolve 
the dissonance being experienced. 
In an effort to elicit motivated self-justification of beliefs in response to 
contradictory information, Batson (1975) presented participants with one-sided evidence 
in a study about religious belief. The study was designed to test the prediction of 
cognitive dissonance that individuals possessing strong beliefs and commitment to 
those beliefs will strengthen instead of weaken their position when exposed to 
convincing evidence that their beliefs are wrong (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 
1956). Participants responded to surveys on their beliefs in religion and the infallibility of 
the Bible, then read an article claiming that religious scholars had proved writings in the 
Bible to be fraudulent. When participants who reported themselves as strongly holding 
religious beliefs were exposed to contradictory evidence, those who believed the 
evidence to be true paradoxically increased their commitment to their beliefs, while 
those skeptical of the evidence were persuaded to slightly decrease the intensity of their 
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beliefs (though not by a statistically significant amount). This indicates that people can 
“double down” on strongly held beliefs in response to belief-incongruent evidence.  
In Batson’s (1975) study, the stakes were relatively high for accepting the new 
information, involving a belief that could not be easily changed and was strongly tied to 
individual identity. It may be that when people claim to believe more strongly after 
viewing convincing counter-arguments, they are actually trying to counteract the doubt 
that they are experiencing. In this case, they are attempting to maintain their self-
concept (see Ecker, Lewandowsky, Fenton, & Martin, 2014 and Gal & Rucker, 2010), in 
line with Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). We will refer to 
this pattern of behavior, where people express increased intensity in their beliefs after 
exposure to high quality incongruent evidence, as dissonant rationalizing. 
Bayesian updating 
Bayesian updating serves as a normative alternative to motivated reasoning and 
dissonant rationalizing. According to a Bayesian model, new evidence is combined with 
prior belief to form a posterior belief. In the simplest version of updating a belief about 
the world, data are randomly sampled and there is no uncertainty about the validity or 
interpretation of the evidence. For example, a person may be interested to know 
whether it is raining outside, and one form of evidence may be the observation of other 
people carrying umbrellas. Observing this evidence makes the belief that it is raining 
outside stronger. Although the potentially emotional topics of interest explored here do 
not fit simply into a Bayesian model, this concept is often used as a normative standard, 
so an attempt is made at constructing such a model to contrast with other accounts of 
belief updating. 
 5 
 Bayes’ rule (Bayes, 1763/1958) is a formulation of basic elements of probability 
theory, describing the joint probability of two variables in terms of the conditional 
probability of one variable and the marginal probability of the other. The joint probability 
of a and b can be written either as: 
P(a,b) = P(a|b)P(b) 
or 
P(a,b) = P(b|a)P(a) 
Combining these equations yields:  
P(a|b)P(b) = P(b|a)P(a) 
which can be rewritten as 
P(b|a) = P(a|b)P(b)/P(a) 
As described in (Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008), this formula can be used 
to represent hypotheses and data. If h represents a hypothesis about a phenomenon 
that gives rise to data, d, then an observer can learn about the probability of h vs. other 
processes, h’, by observing the evidence, d. The posterior probability, P(h|d), or the 
degree of belief in the hypothesis given the observed data, can be expressed as 
P(h|d) = P(d|h)P(h)/P(d) 
P(h|d) is referred to as the posterior probability, and P(d|h) is called the 
likelihood. Likelihoods are used to update posterior beliefs from prior beliefs in light of 
how well the hypothesis predicts observed data. This principle can be used to model 
behavior, often serving as an updating rule for a Bayesian network of hierarchical priors 
with prior distributions over the priors (Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008; see also 
Good, 1980, Gelman et al., 1995, Lee, 2006, Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006). 
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When people are very knowledgeable in a particular domain, their knowledge 
serves as a strong prior, since evidence has already been accumulated. For example, 
scientists have conducted many experiments verifying the value of the maximum speed 
of light in the universe. Each study has contributed evidence that informs the exact 
value. However, not every experimental result is perfect, so findings are accepted or 
rejected based on the quality of the research and taking into account the existence of 
noise in estimates of the exact parameter value.  
Within a Bayesian model, not all evidence should be treated equally. In addition 
to a hypothesis about the value of the speed of light, there are other hypotheses about 
the ways in which a study may be flawed. If a study were to produce a value of the 
speed of light very different from what is known, scientists’ hypothesis about the value 
of the speed of light should not be updated at all; instead, they may adjust their 
hypothesis about the quality of the research and reject the result entirely. A 2011 study 
of neutrinos indicating that they traveled faster than the speed of light provides an 
interesting case study of this scenario. Many scientists were hesitant to accept the 
results based on their deviation from accepted theory; this hesitance was later justified 
when it was discovered that the results were due to faulty equipment (Amelino-Camelia, 
2011; Stephens, 2015). 
Accounts of Bayesian consideration of evidence even allow for evidence to be 
treated differently depending on whether it is in agreement with one’s prior beliefs. If two 
people hold differing prior beliefs, they may treat the same piece of evidence differently 
(see Gerber & Green, 1999 for an account of this). However, unless there is reason to 
suspect the source or otherwise question the validity of the evidence, Bayesian 
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normative accounts still require that people’s prior beliefs be updated in the direction of 
the evidence. This updating can be small, and can even be zero, but it cannot be in the 
opposite direction. Polarization, or adopting a more extreme version of one’s current 
beliefs, can only occur when belief congruent evidence is encountered. Polarization in 
response to belief incongruent evidence is a violation of normative updating in this 
account. 
A complication of using Bayesian updating as a model of beliefs, however, is the 
potentially complex nature of prior beliefs. The potentially vast amount of experiences 
and information that underlies people’s belief structures may necessitate more complex 
models of a hypothesis space that is updated in response to evidence. Jern and 
colleagues (Jern, Chang, & Kemp, 2014) illustrate examples of simple Bayes nets that 
can represent beliefs comprised of more than just one hypothesis. Depending on the 
structure of the network, it is possible for the same piece of evidence to normatively give 
rise to divergent updating. This type of updating can occur without including additional 
motivations, affective or otherwise. For example, two people could read the same 
findings of a study indicating the effectiveness of the death penalty at deterring crime. 
Both people have differing prior beliefs about the effectiveness of the death penalty that 
will be updated according to the study findings. If those individuals also have differing 
beliefs about the consensus of the scientific community with regards to its effectiveness, 
then one person may assume that a study’s results must be extremely convincing for it 
to be published, while another may believe that such studies get published even if the 
evidence isn’t very good, simply because the findings agree with the general consensus 
(Jern et al., 2014). Because of their differing assumptions (representing different beliefs 
 8 
in a hypothesis), these individuals can update their beliefs in different directions while 
still following Bayesian normative principles. 
The present study 
The present study investigated the relationship between attitude congruency bias 
and polarization by presenting participants with evidence-based arguments about 
affectively charged social issues, and examining how individuals changed their beliefs in 
response to those arguments. Because Bayesian accounts suggest people are 
sensitive to the amount of evidence they encounter, the amount of evidence was 
experimentally varied to see if participants responded in a way consistent with the 
normative account. To discriminate between motivated and Bayesian accounts, 
participants were exposed to mixed evidence on some issues and to one-sided 
evidence on others.  
All accounts of attitude change predict polarization in the presence of attitude-
congruent arguments, but differ in their predictions for how people respond to attitude-
incongruent evidence. According to Bayesian models of information processing, people 
are sensitive to the quality and quantity of evidence in a way that depends on their 
priors. Differential judgment of evidence depending on its alignment with prior attitudes 
may reflect the degree to which people are able to integrate new information with extant 
knowledge, and does not necessarily lead to polarization. 
Under the Bayesian model, the exclusive presentation of incongruent evidence 
would not lead participants to have more confidence in their initial beliefs. Participants 
should either change their beliefs in the direction of the evidence (and perhaps more so 
for high quality evidence) or fail to adjust their initial attitudes (if the evidence is not 
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persuasive). It may be that participants with strong prior attitudes already possess 
background knowledge and opinions that are considered along with new information; in 
this case, participants with stronger attitudes may be less persuaded by new evidence 
either congruent or incongruent with prior attitudes, and those with less strong attitudes 
will be more persuaded by new evidence. 
Motivated reasoning accounts suggest participants may polarize when exposed 
to incongruent evidence judged to be of low quality, especially when presented 
alongside attitude-congruent evidence (Lord et al., 1979). Because motivated reasoning 
accounts suggest polarization depends on people’s ability to refute attitude incongruent 
evidence, it may only occur among a subset of participants who feel strongly enough to 
engage in this process. Motivated reasoning suggests polarizing is most likely to occur 
when participants are presented with a mixture of evidence, to occur in participants who 
report attitudes toward the extremes of the attitude scale and/or those who indicate a 
strong emotional investment in the issue, and to be most pronounced in politically 
sophisticated participants who are knowledgeable enough to argue against incongruent 
information (see Taber et al., 2009). 
The dissonant rationalizing account proposes that when the existence of high 
quality incongruent evidence threatens important aspects of their identity, participants 
will engage in self-justification of their beliefs and polarize. Similar to motivated 
reasoning, the dissonant rationalizing account suggests polarization is most likely for 
those participants who are highly committed to their stance on an issue; that is, they 
report attitudes towards the extremes of the attitude scale and indicate a strong 
emotional investment in the issue. The dissonant rationalizing account differs from 
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motivated reasoning in predicting polarization in response to high-quality attitude 
incongruent arguments (rather than low quality incongruent ones). This is because only 
high quality incongruent arguments are likely to activate the dissonant processes 
(Batson, 1975). 
In the present study, participants first responded to a survey regarding their 
attitudes on six controversial topics. They then read arguments regarding three of those 
issues and rated the quality of each argument. Following the presentation of the 
arguments, participants once again responded to a survey regarding their attitudes on 
the six topics. Regression models were used to examine which variables were related to 
participants’ argument ratings, with an emphasis on factors associated with an attitude 
congruency bias. Next, we examined whether this attitude congruency bias produced 
polarization and explored other factors associated with attitude change.  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 124 students (75 female) enrolled in Psychology, Linguistics, or 
Cognitive Science courses at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) 
participating as part of a course requirement. All participants provided informed consent 
and procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at UCSD. 
Participants were between 18 and 35 years old, with a mean age of 21. An additional 
two participants completed the survey, but their results were not included, either 
because their responses suggested they did not understand the rating scale (n=1), or 
because their age was greater than 35 years (n=1). 
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Materials 
The study concerned six socio-political issues: abortion, animal testing, assisted 
suicide, climate change, the death penalty, and school uniforms. These issues were 
among the most popular topics found on two debate websites, www.procon.org and 
idebate.org. 
Attitude measurements. For each issue, a single policy statement was chosen 
for participants to rate in terms of how much they agreed or disagreed (e.g., “Animal 
testing should be banned.”). Below we refer to the “Pro” side of an issue as the one that 
was in agreement with this policy statement, and the “Con” side as contrary to the policy 
statement. This was followed by four position statements for each issue selected from 
two headings under “Points for” on the idebate.org archive, and two from “Points 
against.” Participants responded to all five of these position statements, and these 
responses were combined to form the initial attitude measurement. After the 
experimental treatment, participants again responded to five position statements per 
issue to form the subsequent attitude measurement. 
Affective involvement measurements. For each issue, participants were given 
four questions with a 9-point Likert scale to indicate how much they cared about, and 
had thought about, that issue. Responses to these four questions were combined to 
form a measure of affective involvement. 
Arguments. Using text from the websites, 6 supporting (Pro) and 6 opposing 
(Con) arguments were selected for each issue. Arguments were generally matched for 
content (i.e., if a Pro and a Con argument addressed the same point, both arguments 
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were usually selected), and for length (mean argument length = 120 words, sd = 11). To 
create arguments of similar length, portions of longer arguments were edited. 
Procedure 
The study included three phases: initial collection of attitude and affective 
involvement measurements, the presentation and rating of arguments, and the 
subsequent collection of attitude and affective involvement measurements. 
Initial collection of attitude and affective involvement measurements proceeded one 
issue at a time, as participants first rated their attitude on the issue, and then responded 
to the questions regarding their affective involvement for that issue. The presentation 
order of the six issues was randomly determined. 
Following the collection of attitude and affective involvement measurements, 
each participant was asked to read and rate arguments for three randomly chosen 
issues from the original set of six. For these three issues, one was randomly designated 
as the Pro condition, such that the participant read and rated six arguments in support 
of the original position statement; one was randomly designated as the Con condition, 
such that the participant read and rated six arguments against the original position 
statement; and one was randomly designated as the Mix condition, such that the 
participant read and rated three Pro arguments and three Con argument. The order of 
the issues was randomized, as was the order of the arguments presented within each 
issue. Treatment thus included four conditions: Pro, Con, Mix, and None, with the None 
condition comprising issues for which participants were not presented any argument 
text. Participants rated each argument from “Weak” to “Strong” using a slider bar. 
Numeric values ranged from 0 to 100 and were not visible. 
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After reading all arguments, participants were again asked to rate their attitudes 
on all six issues. Next, participants completed a brief political knowledge quiz to assess 
their political sophistication, and two questions to assess open-mindedness. 
Participants’ political sophistication was represented by their scores on the political 
knowledge quiz, ranging from 0 to 5 (number correct out of 5 items). Finally, participants 
read a debriefing page that explained the goal of the study and provided links to the 
websites used for the argument texts. 
Analysis 
Attitudes were scaled from -5 to 5, with -5 representing the opinion most opposed 
to the issue statement (e.g. “The death penalty should be banned.”) and 5 representing 
maximal agreement with the issue statement. Affective involvement ranged from 0 
(least involvement) to 5 (most involvement). Political sophistication ranged from 0 to 5. 
Items where participants spent too long reading the argument text (more than 3 
standard deviations from the mean, 153 seconds,) were removed from analysis (28 
items out of 2232). 
Participants’ prior attitudes and affective involvement were analyzed to ensure 
uniform representation across conditions, since within each issue treatment (Pro, Con, 
Mix, or None) was varied between subjects. A linear model of prior attitude as a function 
of treatment condition and issue showed that although attitudes varied by issue, there 
were no significant differences among conditions (Pro, Con, Mix, None), nor was there 
any interaction of issue and condition. A linear model of affective involvement similarly 
showed an effect of issue and not experimental condition. Mean values and standard 
deviation for both prior attitude and affective involvement are shown in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1: Prior attitude and affective involvement average values by condition and 
issue. 
 
Issue Condition 
Mean prior 
attitude (sd) 
Mean affective 
involvement (sd) 
Abortion 
None 1.71 (2.53) 6.36 (1.70) 
Pro 2.09 (2.79) 7.02 (1.38) 
Con 2.81 (1.73) 6.53 (1.81) 
Mix 1.36 (2.46) 6.14 (1.27) 
Animal 
testing 
None -0.05 (2.03) 4.92 (1.61) 
Pro 0.17 (2.67) 5.19 (1.78) 
Con -0.11 (2.33) 4.62 (1.33) 
Mix -0.16 (2.06) 5.29 (1.63) 
Assisted 
suicide 
None 0.46 (2.50) 4.88 (1.63) 
Pro -0.41 (2.38) 4.83 (1.41) 
Con -1.11 (1.91) 4.98 (1.00) 
Mix 0.59 (1.90) 4.06 (1.69) 
Climate 
change 
None 2.46 (1.45) 5.76 (1.74) 
Pro 2.71 (1.10) 6.13 (1.67) 
Con 1.97 (2.47) 5.72 (1.97) 
Mix 2.25 (1.27) 5.42 (2.13) 
Death penalty 
None 0.32 (2.09) 4.72 (1.44) 
Pro 0.06 (2.15) 4.18 (1.32) 
Con 0.15 (2.26) 4.52 (1.68) 
Mix -0.25 (2.68) 5.63 (1.49) 
School 
uniforms 
None -0.10 (1.95) 3.70 (1.77) 
Pro -0.76 (2.14) 3.96 (1.86) 
Con 0.06 (2.23) 3.58 (1.52) 
Mix -0.47 (2.37) 3.10 (1.34) 
 
Models of argument rating were analyzed with a linear mixed effects regression 
(LMER) model using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, Walker, et al., 
2014; R Core Team, 2015). All experimental factors were allowed to interact initially and 
backward model selection was used to determine the best-fitting model. Accordingly, 
more complex models were compared with more parsimonious models using ANOVA in 
R. Models were fit with random intercepts and slopes for subjects and items (viz. 
arguments). The reported models are those that included statistically significant 
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experimental predictors of argument rating and were not statistically different from more 
complex models (generally using cut-off p < .01, but trending predictors are also 
reported). 
Models of attitude change were analyzed with a linear model in R. Again, all 
experimental factors were allowed to interact initially; more complex models were 
compared with more parsimonious models using model ANOVA in R. This is 
approximately equivalent to selecting all predictors with a significant p value in the 
model ANOVA. 
For all models, argument polarity (Pro/Con) and argument congruency 
(Congruent/Incongruent) were sum coded; experimental condition (Pro/Con/Mix) was 
treatment coded, with the Mix condition set as the baseline. Issue (Abortion/Assisted 
suicide/Animal testing/Climate change/Death penalty/School uniforms) was also 
treatment coded. Climate change was used as a baseline for Issue because 
participants’ average attitude change for this issue was close to zero. 
Results 
We first assessed whether participants evaluated the arguments in a biased 
manner by analyzing whether their ratings of these arguments differed systematically as 
a function of their prior attitudes. Next, we assessed the factors that influenced attitude 
change in response to these arguments. 
Argument Rating 
Were participants’ argument ratings biased by their initial attitudes about the 
issues? To examine this question, we began by modeling participants’ argument ratings 
with a linear mixed effects model with predictors of treatment condition (Pro, Con, or 
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Mix), argument polarity (Pro or Con), prior attitude, affective involvement, issue, and 
political sophistication. Political sophistication was included because previous studies 
have suggested that sophisticated individuals are more likely to engage in motivated 
reasoning (Taber et al., 2009). Argument polarity was coded separately from treatment 
condition, and represents Pro and Con arguments irrespective of which condition (Pro, 
Con, or Mix) they were presented in. The goal here was to separate potential effects of 
experimental condition from those of argument polarity; that is, whether (for example) a 
given Pro argument would elicit different ratings when presented in the Pro condition, 
and accompanied by five other Pro arguments, versus the Mix condition, where it was 
accompanied by three Con arguments and two other Pro arguments. 
Our model selection procedure revealed that experimental condition did not 
influence the ratings of individual arguments. The best model predicts argument rating 
as a function of prior attitude and argument polarity only (see Equation 1.1 and Table 
1.2 for model results). This linear mixed effects model includes Prior attitude x 
Argument polarity random slopes and Prior attitude and Argument polarity intercepts by 
subject, as well as random intercepts for subjects and items. Arguments in favor of the 
Pro side of an issue were rated more highly by participants whose prior attitudes were 
closer to the Pro side, and rated lower by those with attitudes closer to the Con side. 
Likewise, arguments for the Con side of an issue were rated more highly by participants 
with attitudes closer to the Con side and lower by those with attitudes closer to the Pro 
side of an issue. 
There was a trend for a 3-way interaction of prior attitude, argument polarity, and 
affective involvement (p = .063), with the slope of the Prior attitude x Argument polarity 
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interaction being steeper for participants with high affective involvement. None of the 
other factors reached significance, either as main effects or in interaction with other 
variables. 
 Argument rating ~ Prior attitude x Argument polarity (1.1) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Average argument rating as a function of prior attitude (-5 most opposed, 5 
most in favor of the position statement). Green lines represent Pro arguments presented 
in the Pro and Mix conditions. Red lines represent Con arguments presented in the Con 
and Mix conditions. 
 
Table 1.2: Model results for Equation 1.1 
 
Factor Estimate Std. Error df t-value p-value 
Intercept  56.75 1.15   49.0 < .001 
Prior attitude -0.16 0.26 1 -0.62  .536 
Argument polarity -0.78 1.02 1  -0.76  .449 
Prior attitude x Argument polarity  2.43 0.30 1  8.23 < .001 
 
Figure 1.1 shows how argument ratings differed as a function of participants’ 
prior attitudes, with separate green regression lines shown for supporting arguments 
presented in the Pro condition and in the Mix condition, and separate red regression 
 18 
lines for opposing arguments presented in the Con condition and in the Mix condition. 
The positive slope of both green lines reflects the fact that the more participants support 
the issue statement, the higher they rate the Pro arguments compatible with their 
position. The similarity in the slope of the Mix and the Non-Mix line indicates that 
participants’ ratings of these arguments were similar, regardless of whether they were 
presented in the context of other Pro arguments or with a mixture of Pro and Con 
arguments. Likewise, the negative slope of both red lines reflects systematic bias in the 
ratings of Con arguments, with opponents (-5 on the x-axis) rating attitude-compatible 
Con arguments higher than supporters (+5 on the x-axis), irrespective of whether 
opposing arguments were presented in a Con or a Mix block. 
Attitude Change 
Results above reveal an attitude congruency bias in participants’ ratings of the 
arguments. Ultimately, however, our question is whether and how this bias leads to 
attitude change. To assess this question, we created linear models to predict attitude 
change from experimental treatment controlling for other relevant factors. We also used 
participants’ argument ratings as a predictor of attitude change. 
Initial examination of the data suggested that participants’ attitude change from 
their Prior to Post-survey attitude was toward the center of the attitude scale. Even in 
the control condition in which participants did not read any arguments about the issue, 
participants on the Pro side of an issue had post-survey attitude responses that were 
less supportive, and participants on the Con side had post-survey attitude responses 
that were less opposed to the issue statement. This de-polarization behavior 
presumably reflects regression toward the mean. To correct for this, we used the control 
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condition to compute the change from pre- to post- survey attitude measurements in 
each issue. This average slope was then subtracted from the post-survey attitude 
measurements on that issue in the experimental conditions (Pro, Con, and Mix) to 
derive corrected measurements of attitude change. All analyses below utilized these 
corrected measurements. 
Attitude change can be coded either as the degree to which participants 
polarized (moved further toward the extreme of the attitude scale in the direction of their 
prior attitude) or as change toward the Pro or Con position of an issue. We selected the 
appropriate coding for each account of attitude change in order to determine which one 
best describes the behavioral data. First we describe the analysis in terms of the 
Polarization variable. 
Polarization analysis. Polarization was calculated as change in the direction of 
one’s prior attitude (positive) or toward the opposing position (negative). For example, if 
a participant reported a prior attitude of 1.5 (slightly Pro) and a post-survey attitude of 4 
(more Pro), their Polarization score would be 2.5, representing the presence of 
polarizing. If this same participant’s post-survey attitude were -1.5 (slightly Con), their 
Polarization score would be -3, representing a moderation or anti-polarization of their 
initial attitude. The Polarization variable thus ranged from -10 to 5. 
As noted above, there are two slightly different accounts that suggest a 
relationship between biased argument rating and polarization: motivated reasoning and 
dissonant rationalization. According to motivated reasoning, polarization results when 
participants over-weigh congruent arguments and under-weigh incongruent ones. This 
model predicts polarization will be modeled by an interaction of argument rating and 
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congruency that results because attitude change occurs when congruent arguments are 
rated high and incongruent arguments are rated low. If both of these behaviors are 
necessary for polarizing, we might expect a further interaction with Condition, as 
Polarization would only occur in the Mix condition in which participants encounter both 
congruent and incongruent information. 
The dissonant rationalizing account of polarization predicts that highly-rated 
incongruent arguments will lead to polarizing in conditions where one-sided evidence is 
presented. Here we would expect that the Pro or Con conditions might produce 
evidence of polarization for participants who rated incongruent arguments highly. This 
account suggests that participants in the Pro and Con conditions might polarize when 
they read highly rated incongruent arguments, although this behavior may only be 
apparent in those participants with the highest degree of affective involvement. 
Also of interest is whether the tendency to rate congruent arguments higher than 
incongruent arguments in the Mix condition results in polarizing; that is, is the 
presentation of mixed evidence different from presentation of one-sided evidence? We 
began by constructing a linear model predicting polarization from Argument rating, 
Congruency, and Condition. Political sophistication, Affective involvement, and Issue 
were included in the model and allowed to interact with the other predictors. Backward 
model comparison yielded the best model of Polarization, shown in Equation 2. There is 
an Argument rating by Congruency interaction accompanied by an interaction of 
Condition and Congruency, with a trending additive effect of Issue (p = .026). To 
understand the Condition x Congruency interaction, the data were split with the Mix 
condition analyzed separately and the Pro and Con conditions modeled together. 
 21 
Polarization ~ Argument rating x Congruency + Condition x Congruency (1.2) 
 
Table 1.3: Model results for Equation 1.2 
 
Factor Estimate Std. Error df t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.296 0.196  -1.51 .132 
Argument rating  0.000 0.003 1 -0.10 .923 
Congruency -0.908 0.196 1 -4.63 < .001 
Argument rating:Congruency  0.016 0.003 1  4.92 < .001 
Condition   2     
(Pro)  0.146 0.116   1.27 .021 
(Con)  0.295 0.115   2.56 .001 
Condition x Congruency   2   
(Pro)  0.520 0.116   4.50 < .001 
(Con)  0.380 0.115   3.32 < .001 
 
For mixed evidence, motivated accounts predict that biased rating of arguments 
leads to polarizing. These accounts claim that congruent and incongruent evidence are 
judged by different standards, with congruent evidence being accepted while 
incongruent evidence may be critically examined or mentally argued against. Under 
these accounts, we would expect that both highly rated congruent arguments and low 
rated incongruent arguments can lead to polarizing. This would be shown by an 
interaction of argument rating and congruency, with highly rated congruent arguments 
and low rated incongruent arguments leading to positive polarization values. Some 
participants’ attitudes may remain unchanged, but motivated accounts do not generally 
predict de-polarizing, or negative values of polarization in response to mixed evidence. 
The best model of polarization for the Mix condition is shown in Equation 1.3. 
There was a significant Argument rating x Congruency interaction. Figure 1.2 shows 
how participants’ average argument ratings model polarization for congruent and 
incongruent arguments. While the trend lines are in the direction predicted by motivated 
accounts of polarization, positive polarization does not seem to be present within the 
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confidence interval bounded by the standard error regions of the plot. Instead, only de-
polarization is significantly modeled by both highly rated incongruent arguments and low 
rated congruent arguments. 
 
Polarization ~ Argument rating x Congruency (1.3) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Polarization as a function of argument rating (0 weak, 100 strong) for the Mix 
condition. Pink line represents arguments congruent with participants’ initial attitudes. 
Black line represents arguments incongruent with participants’ initial attitudes. 
 
For one-sided evidence, Bayesian accounts of attitude change predict that 
participants’ attitudes will change in the direction of the evidence presented, not in the 
opposite direction. In terms of the Polarization variable, positive polarization should only 
be present when participants viewed attitude-congruent arguments. “Polarization” may 
be greater when the quality of the evidence is judged to be higher. De-polarization (a 
negative polarization value in this model) is predicted in the presence of attitude-
incongruent arguments, which may be enhanced for higher-quality evidence (those 
arguments receiving higher ratings). 
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There was no significant difference by Condition of the Pro/Con data together, so 
the data were combined in a single model. The linear model that best predicted 
polarization is shown in Equation 1.3 above: the same model was found for the Pro/Con 
data and the Mix data. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Polarization as a function of argument rating (0 weak, 100 strong) for Pro 
and Con conditions. Pink line represents arguments congruent with participants’ initial 
attitudes. Black line represents arguments incongruent with participants’ initial attitudes. 
 
Figure 1.3 shows the nature of the Argument rating x Congruency interaction for 
the one-sided data. The highly rated congruent arguments are associated with 
increased polarization, while highly rated incongruent arguments are associated with 
enhanced de-polarization. Positive polarization was not present for either low or high 
ratings of incongruent arguments. These patterns better match Bayesian or information-
processing accounts of attitude change. Instead of polarization/depolarization, it may 
make more sense to interpret this data as attitude change, in line with Bayesian or 
information-processing accounts of attitude change. 
 24 
Attitude change analysis. To better describe the data in terms of Bayesian 
accounts of information processing and attitude change, we next constructed models 
posed in terms of attitude change instead of polarization. Attitude change was 
calculated simply as participants’ (corrected) post-survey attitude minus their pre-survey 
(prior) attitude. Positive values represented change more in favor of an issue statement, 
and negative values represented change more opposed to it. As in the Polarization 
analysis above, the control condition was used to correct for regression to the mean in 
Attitude change in the experimental conditions. Because Prior attitude is incorporated in 
the Attitude change variable (Post-survey attitude – Prior attitude), it was not included in 
the model of Attitude change. However, in order to potentially distinguish the behavior of 
those holding extreme positions from behavior of those holding moderate positions, we 
created a categorical variable, Position, ranging from -2 to 2, representing participants’ 
relative position with respect to each issue. Data were split into approximate quintiles 
while preserving the same spacing on the positive and negative portions of the attitude 
scale (-5 to -2.5, -2.5 to -1, -1 to 1, 1 to 2.5, 2.5 to 5). Instead of coding argument 
congruency as a single term, we represented rating behavior by including argument 
rating, argument polarity, and participant position in the linear model predicting attitude 
change. 
Under a Bayesian or information-processing account, participants will change 
their attitudes in line with the evidence, especially when the evidence is of high quality. 
We therefore expect that participants in the Pro condition will on average show attitude 
change toward the Pro position on an issue, those in the Con condition will show 
change toward the Con position, and those in the Mix condition may not show attitude 
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change overall. This attitude change may be modulated by the quality of arguments: in 
every condition, highly rated arguments would be predicted to lead to greater attitude 
change in the direction of the arguments. This would be modeled as a 2-way interaction 
of Rating and Argument polarity, where highly-rated arguments lead to attitude change 
in the direction of Argument polarity independent of participants’ position on an issue. 
By contrast, motivated accounts predict a 3-way interaction among argument 
rating, argument polarity, and position, where highly rated arguments congruent with 
participants’ positions lead to attitude change in the direction of the arguments, and low 
rated incongruent arguments lead to attitude change in the opposite direction of the 
arguments (i.e. in the direction of the participant’s position). This pattern may further 
modulated by condition, arising more prominently in the Mix condition, and by 
participants’ levels of affective involvement with the issues, being more evident in 
participants who feel the most strongly. 
A linear model was created predicting corrected attitude change with factors of 
Argument rating, Argument polarity, Position, treatment Condition (Pro/Con/Mix), 
Affective involvement, and Political sophistication. Backward model comparison was 
used to compare more complex models to more parsimonious models retaining 
significant predictors. The best model of attitude change included an Argument rating x 
Argument polarity interaction, a Condition x Position interaction, and an interaction of 
Position and Issue. This model is shown in Equation1.4. 
 
Attitude change ~ Argument rating x Argument polarity + Condition x Position 
+ Position x Issue (1.4) 
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Table 1.4. Partial model results for Equation 1.4 
 
Factor Estimate Std. Error df t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.866 0.499  -1.73 .084 
Argument Polarity 2.054 0.381 1 5.40 < .001 
Argument rating 0.022 0.004 1 5.11 < .001 
Argument rating:Polarity -0.036	 0.006 1 -5.69 < .001 
Condition   2     
(Pro) 0.095 0.241  0.39 0.695 
(Con) -0.656 0.240  -2.74 0.006 
Position   4   
(-2) 1.888 0.857  2.20 0.028 
(-1) -0.057 0.336  -0.17 0.865 
(1) -0.530 0.462  -1.15 0.251 
(2) -0.988 0.475  -2.08 0.038 
Issue   5   
(Abortion) -0.761 0.500  -1.52 0.129 
(Assisted suicide) -0.455 0.488  -0.93 0.352 
(Animal testing) 0.193 0.461  0.42 0.676 
(Death penalty) -0.632 0.490  -1.29 0.198 
(School uniforms) -0.310 0.462  -0.67 0.503 
 
As shown in Figure 1.4, attitude change following highly rated arguments is on 
average more in line with the arguments. There appears to be change in the opposite 
direction of arguments for low rated Pro arguments, but this pattern is primarily due to 
behavior in the Mix condition, where Pro arguments are also viewed along with Con 
arguments, meaning some of the change may be due to highly rated Con arguments. 
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Figure 1.4: Interaction of argument rating and argument polarity. The red line represents 
average attitude change following Con arguments in the Con or Mix condition. The 
green line represents average attitude change following Pro arguments. 
 
There is a Condition x Position interaction, with participants in the Mix condition 
showing de-polarizing behavior: those initially most in favor of the issue reported 
attitudes less in favor, and those most opposed reported attitudes less opposed to the 
issue after viewing arguments. This interaction is shown in Figure 1.5. There is no 
significant Condition x Position interaction when the Pro and Con conditions are 
modeled separately, although there is a main effect of Condition, with participants in the 
Pro condition changing their attitude in the Pro direction and those in the Con condition 
changing their attitude in the Con direction. 
 
 28 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Attitude change as a function of Position. Position represents participants’ 
initial attitudes, from -2 (most opposed) to 2 (most in favor of an issue statement). 
Position is modeled as a categorical variable, but is plotted as a numerical range to 
show trends. Lines represent the Pro (green), Con (red), and Mix (yellow) conditions. 
 
The Position x Issue interaction results because attitude change varied 
depending on the issue presented and participants’ initial attitudes. Individual estimates 
for each issue relative to Climate change (where participants showed the least amount 
of attitude change) and position relative to 0 are shown in Table 1.5. 
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Table 1.5. Continued model results for Equation 1.4: Condition x Position and Issue x 
Position interaction coefficients 
 
Factor Estimate Std. Error df t-value p-value 
Condition:Position 	  8   
(Pro : -2) -0.218 0.378  -0.58 0.565 
(Pro : -1) 0.490 0.364  1.35 0.179 
(Pro :  1) 1.066 0.313  3.41 <	0.001 
(Pro :  2) 0.209 0.324  0.64 0.519 
(Con: -2) -0.242 0.395  -0.61 0.540 
(Con: -1) -0.120 0.353  -0.34 0.734 
(Con:  1) 0.963 0.318  3.03 0.003 
(Con:  2) 0.294 0.324  0.91 0.364 
Issue:Position   19   
(AB: -2) 0.185 0.949  0.19 0.846 
(AB: -1) 1.234 0.789  1.57 0.118 
(AB:  1) 0.622 0.584  1.06 0.288 
(AB:  2) 1.291 0.548  2.36 0.019 
(AS: -2) -0.506 0.906  -0.56 0.576 
(AS: -1) 1.192 0.444  2.68 0.008 
(AS:  1) -0.079 0.551  -0.14 0.886 
(AS:  2) 0.852 0.649  1.31 0.189 
(AT: -2) -2.096 0.875  -2.39 0.017 
(AT: -1) -0.243 0.414  -0.59 0.557 
(AT:  1) -0.289 0.538  -0.54 0.592 
(AT:  2) 0.770 0.552  1.40 0.164 
(DP: -2) -1.528 0.900  -1.70 0.090 
(DP: -1) 0.379 0.434  0.87 0.383 
(DP:  1) 0.124 0.557  0.22 0.824 
(DP:  2) 0.670 0.590  1.14 0.257 
(SU: -2) -1.507 0.881  -1.71 0.088 
(SU:  1) -0.588 0.535  -1.10 0.272 
(SU:  2) 0.766 0.614  1.25 0.213 
 
Discussion 
The present study was designed to replicate patterns of argument evaluation 
shown in previous studies (Edwards & Smith, 1996; Taber et al., 2009), and to critically 
examine whether biased argument rating leads to the polarization of attitudes. The latter 
is suggested by a motivated account of reasoning, and contrasts with a Bayesian 
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account in which participants are sensitive to the merits of the evidence. Although our 
participants produced biased argument ratings, they did not polarize. In keeping with 
Bayesian accounts, attitude change was largely a function of the number of arguments 
participants read and their perceived quality. When attitude incongruent arguments 
were considered credible, participants changed their attitudes in response to them. 
Argument Rating 
Participants rated arguments that were congruent with their prior policy opinions 
as objectively better than arguments that were incongruent with those opinions. 
Moreover, this attitude congruency bias scaled linearly with participants’ prior opinions, 
as those at either end of the scale showed the greatest bias in argument ratings. 
Edwards and Smith (1996) similarly showed that argument strength ratings were 
correlated with participants’ prior beliefs for most of the issues in their study. Similarly, 
Taber and colleagues (2009) found that prior attitude significantly predicted an attitude 
congruency bias when participants read long arguments (with the same pattern trending 
for short and two-sided arguments). The findings of the present study are in line with 
prior work, potentially supporting a motivated account of argument strength rating. 
However, in conflict with accounts that suggest motivated reasoning processes are 
triggered by the presentation of a mixture of attitude congruent and incongruent 
information (Tabor, et al., 2009), our participants’ argument ratings showed similar 
patterns in response to mixed and one-sided evidence. The present study thus 
suggests that attitude congruency bias does not require the presentation of mixed 
evidence to arise.  
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In fact, attitude congruency bias might be interpreted as consistent with a 
Bayesian reasoning account in which participants at the ends of the scale are assumed 
to assign a high likelihood to data consistent with their own position. In terms of 
cognitive models, prior probabilities may represent background knowledge on a topic, 
which serves as a standard by which new information can be judged. (Griffiths, Kemp, & 
Tenenbaum, 2008). Evidence that is incompatible with a well-informed attitude may be 
correctly judged as weak (see Gerber & Green, 1999), although there is some debate 
regarding the appropriateness of using one’s prior beliefs to judge the quality of 
evidence (cf. Koehler, 1993, Kahan, 2016). To dissociate motivated from Bayesian 
reasoning, it is necessary to examine the attitude change data. 
Attitude Change 
Our initial analysis indicated that while attitude congruent evidence did indeed 
lead to polarization, incongruent evidence did not. Contrary to the predictions of 
dissonant rationalizing, strongly rated incongruent evidence led to depolarization (see 
Figures 1.2 and 1.3), that is, attitude change away from participants’ original positions. 
Moreover, while attitude change in response to mixed evidence was somewhat in 
keeping with the predictions of motivated reasoning, showing a trend for polarization in 
response to weak incongruent evidence, attitude change never rose significantly above 
zero (Figure 1.2). So while our participants did not polarize in response to attitude 
incongruent evidence that was judged weak, they did de-polarize in response to 
incongruent evidence that was judged to be strong (Figures 1.2 and 1.3).  
Our failure to find polarization in response to attitude incongruent arguments thus 
contrasts with previous accounts of polarization following exposure to mixed evidence 
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(Lord et al., 1979, Taber et al., 2009). This may be due to methodological differences 
between the studies, particularly in the administration of pre- and post- treatment 
attitude measurements. However, when the original study by Lord and colleagues was 
replicated with a similar before and after scale, findings of polarizing were not observed 
(Miller, McHoskey, Bane, & Dowd, 1993). Taber et al. (2009) point out that polarizing 
only arises under specific circumstances, and that highly affective content is needed to 
activate the motivated processes that lead to polarizing. Our failure to find polarization 
may be because our materials did not sufficiently evoke affective responses from our 
participants.  
 In fact, attitude change observed in the present study was largely a function of 
the quantity and the quality of the arguments presented to the participants. As outlined 
in Equation 1.4, three independent factors contributed to attitude change. The first 
involved argument rating and argument polarity; the second involved experimental 
condition and participant position; and, the third involved participant position and issue. 
The interaction of argument rating and argument polarity results because participants 
responded to highly rated arguments by moving in the direction of those arguments. 
Regardless of their positions, participants responded to highly rated Pro arguments by 
moving in the Pro direction, and to highly rated Con arguments by moving in the Con 
direction (see Figure 1.4).  
The interaction of condition and position is illustrated in Figure 1.5, and generally 
reflects attitude change in the direction of the evidence. Participants in the Pro condition 
were slightly more supportive of the issue statement after reading six Pro arguments, 
with the strongest opponents changing more than those who already favored the Pro 
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position. Participants in the Con condition were slightly more opposed to the issue 
statement after reading six Con arguments. Participants in the Mix condition, that is, 
those who viewed 3 arguments on either side tended to de-polarize, with opponents 
moving in the Pro direction and supporters moving in the Con direction. Finally, the 
interaction of position and issue merely reflects the fact that participants de-polarized 
more for some issues than others. 
As noted above, while prior attitude (position) was relevant for attitude change, 
we found no evidence for the polarization phenomenon predicted by motivated 
reasoning. Instead we found that for a subset of issues, participants showed a 
moderating response to the evidence; that is, their attitudes shifted toward the center of 
the attitude scale. This is in line with Bayesian models of beliefs in which prior 
distributions over belief in hypotheses are revised in response to new evidence (see 
Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008 for an overview). 
Griffiths et al. (2008) describes cognitive models where inferences are made in 
light of background knowledge, allowing for inductive reasoning. People can learn 
distributions of data in an environment by comparing competing hypotheses with new 
information. New information allows hypotheses to be revised, and in the case of 
hierarchical priors (prior distributions over other distributions), revision of one hypothesis 
can lead to the revision of additional hypotheses. Although these models do not 
specifically cover revisions of belief about social issues, the principles could reasonably 
apply to this domain, since individual beliefs may be composed of several related 
hypotheses, and new information can help distinguish among competing hypotheses 
about the structure of the socio-political environment. 
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Conclusion 
The present study suggests the relationship between argument ratings and 
attitude change was more consistent with a Bayesian account than the biased 
assimilation process predicted by motivated reasoning. That is, with motivated 
reasoning we would expect both highly rated congruent arguments and low-rated 
incongruent ones to lead to opinion change in the direction of participants’ prior 
opinions. Instead, we saw that highly rated arguments were associated with movement 
in the direction of the arguments themselves, regardless of their congruency with 
participants’ prior beliefs. This is evidence in favor of a Bayesian account and shows 
that in spite of the biases evident in participants’ ratings of arguments, their attitude 
change seems to be based on the evidence presented. 
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Chapter 2 
The role of active arguing in predicting attitude change 
 
Study 1 revealed an attitude congruency bias, but this bias did not lead to 
polarization of participants’ attitudes. The present study replicates and extends Study 1 
by adding participant text response. This addition provides an opportunity for 
participants to list what they were thinking about when rating arguments, which may 
activate an active arguing strategy suggested by previous accounts of motivated 
reasoning (Edwards & Smith, 1996, Taber & Lodge, 2006, Taber et al., 2009). 
The attitude change results from Study 1 seem to support a rational information-
processing model better than the dissonant rationalizing account. On this motivated 
account, participants who are strongly committed to an issue would be predicted to 
polarize in response to incongruent evidence. We did not find this pattern of polarizing 
by participants with either strong prior opinions or strong affective commitment to an 
issue. Instead, we found that while prior attitude may have mattered differentially for 
some issues, participants showed a slight de-polarizing effect overall. 
One limitation of the prior study was the use of a highly educated sample from an 
elite university. The rational behavior evidenced by these participants may not 
generalize to a larger sample. It may be that, as Taber and colleagues suggest, some 
studies are not able to elicit polarizing because participants are not engaged enough or 
not exposed to highly affective stimuli (Taber et al., 2009). It is possible that we did not 
find evidence of polarizing because participants were not actively judging the arguments 
by writing down their thoughts, as they did in Taber et al. (2009). This is addressed in 
the present study.  
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 In Study 1, more highly rated arguments resulted in greater attitude change in the 
direction of the arguments. However, it is unknown whether this reflects the effects of 
the participants’ bias or persuasion by what participants believe to be quality arguments. 
Argument rating was predicted by prior attitudes in line with the arguments, meaning 
this study does somewhat confound the variables of argument rating and prior attitude. 
To assess the effects of bias vs. argument quality, we would need some objective rating 
of argument quality. This issue is preliminarily explored in the present study and further 
addressed with a detailed model in Study 3. 
 Study 1 demonstrates that the attitude congruency bias, where people judge 
information compatible with their beliefs as stronger than incompatible information, is a 
robust phenomenon. The presence of the attitude congruency bias did not lead to 
polarization of participants’ attitudes. Instead, the attitude change measurements 
revealed sensitivity to both the quantity and the quality of the argumentative texts that 
participants viewed. These data are in line with Bayesian accounts of information 
processing. 
Previous work has found evidence of a disconfirmation bias, where participants 
spend more time reading arguments incompatible with their prior attitudes (Edwards & 
Smith, 1996). Participants also produce more denigrating arguments in response to 
incompatible arguments. This bias has been shown to model attitude polarization in a 
study involving highly affective political issues (Taber et al., 2009). The present study 
tests for this disconfirmation bias using four socio-political issues used in a previous 
study. 
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Accounts of motivated reasoning suggest that both biased processing of belief-
compatible information and a disconfirmation bias lead to attitude polarization following 
mixed evidence. The present study provided a mixture of mixed and one-sided 
evidence, similar to Study 1, with the addition of active arguing in the form of prompts 
following the presentation of information to elicit participants’ thoughts as they rated 
arguments congruent and incongruent with their prior attitudes. 
If active arguing does activate biased processing that was absent in Study 1, we 
should find evidence that participants polarized in their attitudes, adjusting in line with 
their initial opinions. We tested for polarizing by comparing two models of attitude 
change, one that models attitude change based on the quality of the evidence and one 
that allows for polarizing. To test for the presence of disconfirmation bias, we modeled 
time spent reading arguments as a function of their congruency with participants’ 
attitudes. We also examined the nature of participants’ text to see whether more 
negative affect is present in response to incongruent arguments. Finally, we explored 
whether attitude change in response to highly-rated arguments is due to the objective 
quality of the arguments, or whether participants’ bias may be driving attitude change. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 128 students (75 female) enrolled in Psychology, Linguistics, or 
Cognitive Science courses at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) 
participating as part of a course requirement. All participants provided informed consent 
and procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at UCSD. 
Participants were between 18 and 32 years old, with a mean age of 21. An additional 
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three participants completed the survey, but their results were not included, either 
because their responses suggested they did not understand the rating scale (n=1), or 
because their written responses were insufficient in length or content (n=2). Data from a 
single issue was removed for seven participants due to survey error (e.g., one or more 
responses failed to be recorded correctly). 
Materials 
Four socio-political issues were examined: abortion, animal testing, assisted 
suicide, and the death penalty. These issues were among the most popular topics found 
on two debate websites, www.procon.org and idebate.org. These issues were selected 
from those used in Study 1. We elected not to use the climate change issue because 
attitudes on this topic were homogeneous as virtually all of the participants in our pool 
agreed strongly with the statement that human activity contributes to climate change. 
The school uniforms issue was dropped because Study 1 suggested it engendered low 
levels of affective involvement. Otherwise, materials for attitude measurements, 
affective involvement measurements, and argument texts were identical to those used 
in Study 1. 
Attitude measurements. For each issue, a single policy statement was chosen 
for participants to rate in terms of how much they agreed or disagreed (e.g., “Animal 
testing should be banned.”). Below we refer to the “Pro” side of an issue as the one that 
was in agreement with this policy statement, and the “Con” side as contrary to the policy 
statement. This was followed by four position statements for each issue selected from 
two headings under “Points for” on the idebate.org archive, and two from “Points 
against.” Participants responded to all five of these position statements, and these 
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responses were combined to form the initial attitude measurement. After the 
experimental treatment, participants again responded to five position statements per 
issue to form the subsequent attitude measurement. 
Affective involvement measurements. For each issue, participants were given 
four questions with a 9-point Likert scale to indicate how much they cared about, and 
had thought about, that issue. Responses to these four questions were combined to 
form a measure of affective involvement. 
Arguments. Using text from the websites, 6 supporting (Pro) and 6 opposing 
(Con) arguments were selected for each issue. Arguments were generally matched for 
content (i.e., if a Pro and a Con argument addressed the same point, both arguments 
were usually selected), and for length (mean argument length = 120 words, sd = 11). To 
create arguments of similar length, portions of longer arguments were omitted. 
Procedure 
As in Study 1, there were three phases: initial collection of attitude and affective 
involvement measurements; the presentation and rating of arguments, along collection 
of written responses to arguments; and the subsequent collection of attitude and 
affective involvement measurements.  
Initial collection of attitude and affective involvement measurements proceeded 
one issue at a time, as participants first rated their attitude on the issue, and then 
responded to the questions regarding their affective involvement in that issue. The 
presentation order of the four issues was randomly determined.  
Following the collection of attitude and affective involvement measurements, 
each participant was asked to read and rate arguments for three randomly chosen 
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issues from the original set of four. For these three issues, one was randomly 
designated as the Pro condition, such that the participant read and rated six arguments 
in support of the issue statement; one was randomly designated as the Con condition, 
such that the participant read and rated six arguments against the issue statement; and 
one was randomly designated as the Mix condition, such that the participant read and 
rated three Pro arguments and three Con arguments. The order of the issues was 
randomized, as was the order of the arguments presented within each issue. 
After half of the arguments, participants were instructed to type into the text box 
what they were thinking about as they rated the previous argument. Participants could 
spend as much time on this free response task as they desired, but they were not 
allowed to advance to the next section until at least 60 seconds had elapsed. This was 
intended to encourage participants to respond during this interval.  
After reading all arguments, participants were again asked to rate their positions 
on all four issues. Following the post-treatment attitude measurements, participants 
completed a brief political knowledge quiz to assess their political sophistication and 
answered two questions to assess their open-mindedness. Finally, they read a 
debriefing page that explained the goal of the study and provided links to the websites 
used for the argument texts. 
Analysis 
Attitudes were scaled from -5 to 5, with -5 representing maximal disagreement 
with the issue statement, (e.g. "The death penalty should be banned,") and 5 
representing maximal agreement with it. Items where participants spent too long 
 41 
reading the argument text (more than 3 standard deviations from the mean, 332 
seconds) were removed from analysis (21 items out of 2262). 
Participants' prior opinions and affective involvement were analyzed to ensure 
uniform representation across experimental conditions, since within each issue, the 
conditions (Pro, Con, Mix, or None) were varied between subjects. A linear model of 
prior opinion as a function of treatment condition and issue showed that although 
opinions varied by issue (F = 22.1 p < .001), there were no significant differences 
among conditions (Pro, Con, Mix, None), and no interaction of issue and condition. 
Models of argument rating were analyzed with a linear mixed effects regression 
(LMER) model using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, Walker, et al., 
2014; R Core Team, 2015). All experimental factors were allowed to interact initially; 
more complex models were compared with more parsimonious models using ANOVA in 
R. Models were fit with random intercepts for subjects and items (viz. arguments). The 
reported models are those that included statistically significant experimental predictors 
of argument rating and were not statistically different from more complex models 
(generally using cut-off p < .01, but trending predictors are also reported). 
Models of attitude change were analyzed with a linear model in R. Again, all 
experimental factors were allowed to interact initially; more complex models were 
compared with more parsimonious models using model ANOVA in R. This is 
approximately equivalent to selecting all predictors with a significant p value in the 
model ANOVA. 
For all models, argument polarity (Pro/Con) was sum coded; experimental 
condition (Pro/Con/Mix) was treatment coded, with the Mix condition set as the 
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baseline. Issue (Abortion/Assisted suicide/Animal testing/ Death penalty) was also 
treatment coded. Abortion was used as a baseline for Issue because participants’ 
average attitude change for this issue was close to zero. 
Results 
As in Study 1, we first assessed whether participants evaluated the arguments in 
a biased manner by analyzing whether their ratings of these arguments differed 
systematically as a function of their prior attitudes. Next, we assessed the factors that 
influenced attitude change in response to these arguments. 
Argument Rating 
To examine whether participants’ argument ratings were biased by their initial 
attitudes, as in the previous study we began by modeling participants’ argument ratings 
with a linear mixed effects model with predictors of treatment condition (Pro, Con, or 
Mix), argument polarity (Pro or Con), prior attitude, affective involvement, issue, and 
political sophistication. Argument polarity was coded separately from treatment 
condition, and represents Pro and Con arguments irrespective of which condition (Pro, 
Con, or Mix) they were presented in. This is to separate the potential effects of 
experimental condition from those of argument polarity; that is, whether (for example) a 
given Pro argument would elicit different ratings when presented in the Pro condition, 
and accompanied by five other Pro arguments, versus the Mix condition, where it was 
accompanied by thee Con arguments and two other Pro arguments. 
The best model predicts argument rating as a function of prior opinion, argument 
polarity, and issue (see Equation 2.1 and Table 2.1 for model results). Experimental 
condition did not influence the ratings of individual arguments (though there was a 
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marginal difference between a 4-way interaction including Condition and the 3-way 
interaction, p =  .047). None of the other factors were significant, either as main effects 
or in interaction with other variables. 
To further explore this interaction, the rating data were modeled by issue. 
Argument ratings for every condition showed a significant Prior attitude x Argument 
polarity interaction, with arguments in the attitude-congruent condition rated higher than 
arguments in the incongruent condition. Although the slopes of the lines differ by issue, 
the direction of the interaction is consistent across all conditions. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
the three-way interaction by showing the two-way Prior attitude x Argument polarity 
interaction for each issue. 
 
Argument rating ~ Prior attitude x Argument polarity x Issue (2.1) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Average argument rating as a function of prior attitude (-5 most opposed, 5 
most in favor of the position statement). Green lines represent Pro arguments presented 
in the Pro and Mix conditions. Red lines represent Con arguments presented in the Con 
and Mix conditions. Separate graphs are shown for the four different issues: Abortion, 
Animal testing, Assisted suicide, and Death penalty. 
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Table 2.1: Model results for Equation 2.1 
 
Factor Estimate Std. Error df t-value p-value 
Intercept 56.963 3.356  16.97 < 0.001 
Prior attitude 1.932 0.654 1 2.95 0.004 
Argument polarity -1.329 4.699 1 -0.28 0.778 
Issue   3   
(Assisted suicide) 3.318 4.481  0.74 0.462 
(Animal testing) 9.694 4.497  2.16 0.036 
(Death penalty) -4.831 4.515  -1.07 0.289 
Prior attitude x Argument polarity -6.600 0.934 1 -7.07 < 0.001 
Prior attitude x Issue   3   
(Assisted suicide) 0.484 0.922  0.53 0.600 
(Animal testing) 1.530 0.985  1.55 0.121 
(Death penalty) 0.797 0.990  0.81 0.421 
Argument polarity x Issue   3   
(Assisted suicide) -6.517 6.341  -1.03 0.309 
(Animal testing) -7.013 6.415  -1.09 0.279 
(Death penalty) 7.864 6.404  1.23 0.225 
Prior attitude x Argument polarity 
x Issue   
3 
  
(Assisted suicide) 2.424 1.268  1.91 0.056 
(Animal testing) 1.048 1.389  0.75 0.451 
(Death penalty) 0.368 1.362  0.27 0.787 
 
Argument rating data in Study 2 thus replicate the attitude congruency bias seen 
in Study 1, in keeping with prior reports by previous investigators (Edwards & Smith, 
1996; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1975; Taber et al., 2009). Below we examine whether 
these biased ratings were associated with polarized attitude change. 
Participant reading time and sentiment 
To test for the presence of a disconfirmation bias, we modeled participants’ 
reading time for each argument as a function of the argument’s congruency with prior 
attitudes. A linear mixed effects regression model with reading time as a function of 
prior attitude and argument polarity failed to reach significance, as did a model of log 
reading times. Neither model was improved by the addition of affective involvement 
and/or political sophistication. Participants in the present study did not spend more time 
 45 
reading incongruent arguments, as found in prior research (Edwards & Smith, 1996, 
Taber et al., 2009). 
Participants’ text responses were coded for sentiment on a positive-negative 
scale using the Stanford CoreNLP server (Manning et al., 2014) with a Python package. 
Each text response was processed as a single item and assigned a numeric score. 
Positive values represent positive sentiment, and negative values represent negative 
sentiment. Numeric sentiment scores ranged from -1.43 to 1.54 and were skewed 
negative. 
We first assessed whether participants generated more negative response to 
attitude-incongruent arguments than to congruent arguments. To test this, we modeled 
sentiment as a function of prior attitude and argument polarity. A linear mixed effects 
regression model with sentiment as a function of Prior attitude x Argument polarity failed 
to reach significance. The addition of affective involvement and/or political sophistication 
did not cause this interaction to reach significance. 
We next modeled sentiment as a function of argument rating because, although 
rating is highly correlated with arguments’ congruency with prior attitudes (Eq. 2.1), 
participants’ responses to arguments may have more to do with their objective quality 
than their alignment with participants’ attitudes. A linear mixed effects regression model 
of sentiment as a function of argument rating reached significance compared to an 
intercept-only model (X2[1,1120] = 50.7, p < .001). This model was not improved by the 
addition of affective involvement and/or political sophistication. Participants’ sentiments 
were thus related to the ratings they provided assessing each argument’s strength, and 
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not to their congruency with prior attitudes (although these variables are highly 
correlated). 
Attitude change 
As in Study 1, we next assessed whether and how the attitude congruency bias 
shown above leads to attitude change. We created linear models to predict attitude 
change from experimental treatment and participants’ argument ratings. Attitude change 
was calculated as participants’ post-survey attitude minus their pre-survey (prior) 
attitude. Positive values represented change in the Pro direction (more supportive of the 
issue statement), and negative values represented change in the Con direction (more 
opposed to the issue statement). 
An overall regression toward the mean was present in the attitude measurements 
in all conditions, even the control condition where no arguments were viewed. On 
average, participants' attitude change from their Prior to Post-treatment attitude was 
toward the center of the attitude scale. Consequently, we used participants’ responses 
in the control condition to calculate a correction factor. Accordingly, initial attitude 
measurements in each issue were used to predict attitude scores in that issue at the 
end of the study. This average slope, calculated for the control condition in which 
participants did not read any arguments, was subtracted from each participants’ attitude 
change score. The calculation was performed separately for each issue because the 
correction factor differed as a function of issue. This effectively corrects for regression 
toward the mean in the experimental conditions. All analyses of attitude change utilize 
these corrected values. 
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To test whether participants’ attitude change is best modeled by the amount and 
quality of the evidence, we began with the model of attitude change from Study 1.  
 
Attitude change ~ Argument rating x Argument polarity + Condition x Position 
+ Position x Issue (2.2) 
 
We compared the model in (2.2) with a model including a 3-way interaction of argument 
rating, argument polarity, and position (2.3). 
 
Attitude change ~ Argument rating x Argument polarity x Position + Condition x 
Position + Position x Issue (2.3) 
 
Model ANOVA suggested the addition of the Position factor did not improve the 
model (F[12,2241] = 1.13, p = .33). Additionally, the 3-way interaction in Equation 2.3 
did not reach significance (F[4,2241] = 0.87, p  = .48). An ANOVA performed on the 2-
way interaction model (Equation 2.2) revealed that the Position x Issue interaction was 
trending, but did not reach significance (p = .022). To simplify the reporting of results, 
estimates in Table 2.2 are shown for Equation 2.4, the best model predicting attitude 
change for the present study. 
 
Attitude change ~ Argument rating x Argument polarity + Condition x Position + 
Issue (2.4) 
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Table 2.2: Model results for Equation 2.4 
 
Factor Estimate Std. Error df t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.060 0.253  -0.24 0.812 
Argument Polarity -0.936 0.214 1 -4.38 < 0.000 
Argument rating 0.000 0.003 1 -0.04 0.966 
Argument rating:Polarity 0.017 0.004 1 4.66 < 0.001 
Condition   2     
(Pro) 0.591 0.236  2.51 0.013 
(Con) -0.369 0.234  -1.58 0.115 
Position   4   
(-2) 1.410 0.258  5.46 < 0.001 
(-1) 0.985 0.235  4.18 < 0.001 
(1) -0.279 0.201  -1.39 0.165 
(2) -0.210 0.208  -1.01 0.313 
Issue   3   
(Assisted suicide) 0.120 0.143  0.84 0.403 
(Animal testing) -0.070 0.156  -0.45 0.654 
(Death penalty) -0.307 0.151  -2.03 0.043 
Condition:Position   8   
(Pro : -2) -1.170 0.393  -2.98 0.003 
(Pro : -1) -0.620 0.403  -1.54 0.124 
(Pro :  1) 0.087 0.360  0.24 0.809 
(Pro :  2) -0.541 0.348  -1.55 0.121 
(Con: -2) -1.231 0.418  -2.94 0.003 
(Con: -1) 0.352 0.434  0.81 0.418 
(Con:  1) -0.254 0.342  -0.74 0.458 
(Con:  2) 0.000 0.327  0.00 0.999 
 
The Argument rating x Argument polarity interaction is shown in Figure 2.2. As in 
Study 1, attitude change following highly rated arguments is on average in the direction 
of the arguments. 
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Figure 2.2: Interaction of argument rating and argument polarity. The red line represents 
average attitude change following Con arguments in the Con or Mix condition. The 
green line represents average attitude change following Pro arguments. 
 
As in Study 1, Study 2 revealed a Condition x Position interaction that reflects de-
polarizing. Figure 2.3 shows that opponents in the Pro condition (to the left of zero on 
the x-axis) displayed more positive attitude change than supporters, and supporters in 
the Con condition (to the right of zero on the x-axis) show more negative attitude 
change than opponents. In fact, participants in the Mix condition showed slightly more 
de-polarizing behavior than participants in the Pro and Con conditions. This result is 
contrary to the hot cognition account that suggests the presentation of a mixture of 
evidence triggers motivated reasoning processes that result in polarized attitude 
change. These data suggest that although attitude change effects were small, attitude 
incongruent arguments were actually more influential than congruent ones. 
Study 2 also replicated the interaction between Argument rating and Argument 
polarity observed in Study 1. That is, irrespective of participants’ positions on the issues, 
attitude change was associated with viewing highly rated arguments. These findings are 
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consistent with the Bayesian framework outlined in the previous chapter in showing that 
the direction of attitude change depended on the evidence, with greater attitude change 
after encountering evidence that was deemed to be of high quality (see Figure 2.2). 
However, interpretation of these data is complicated by the presence of the attitude 
congruency bias in the argument ratings. That is, participants systematically inflated the 
ratings for attitude congruent arguments so that observed data might reflect the 
influence of these biases rather than increased sensitivity to arguments that were 
objectively better.    
 
	
	
Figure 2.3: Attitude change as a function of Position. Position represents participants’ 
initial attitudes, from -2 (most opposed) to 2 (most in favor of an issue statement). 
Position is modeled as a categorical variable, but is plotted as a numerical range to 
show trends. Lines represent the Pro (green), Con (red), and Mix (yellow) conditions. 
 
To better test whether high quality attitude incongruent arguments led to attitude 
change in the direction of the arguments, we used argument ratings from a previous 
study (Study 1) to model attitude change. This separates the effect of the quality of 
arguments themselves from the effect of participants’ biased ratings. For this 
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exploratory analysis, argument ratings from all participants in Study 1 were averaged for 
each argument. These averaged values were used in place of subjects’ ratings in the 
present study to represent average argument quality as judged by a separate set of 
participants with similar characteristics (participants are drawn from the same subject 
pool of UCSD students). 
The above model of attitude change (Equation 2.4) was modified to include 
Objective rating as a predictor instead of Argument rating. The modified model is shown 
in Equation 2.5 below.  
Attitude change ~ Objective rating x Argument polarity + Condition x Position + 
Issue (2.5) 
 
 AIC values were used to compare this model to the model using participants’ 
own ratings. The models were shown to be significantly different (AIC = 1549 vs. 1566), 
with the model using participants’ own ratings outperforming the model with Objective 
rating. Model ANOVA on the objective rating model showed that this variable achieved 
a conventional level of significance in predicting attitude change (p = .019 for the 
Objective rating x Argument polarity interaction). 
 These results show that at least some of the attitude change modeled by 
argument ratings is due to the quality of arguments themselves, although some of this 
change may be due to the participants’ own bias that was present in the argument 
ratings. The relative contribution of bias versus objective quality is addressed more 
directly in the study described in Chapter 3. 
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Overall, Study 2 replicates the findings of Study 1, even though the present study 
required participants to justify their argument ratings with a textual response. This 
suggests our earlier failure to find the phenomenon of attitude polarization reported by 
Taber and colleagues (2009) did not result because of this methodological detail. While 
participants still exhibited a robust attitude congruency bias, favoring arguments in line 
with their prior attitudes, they did not appear to engage in argumentative strategies 
while reading and responding to argument text. Rather than spending more time 
reading incongruent texts and producing more negative responses, participants’ reading 
time did not vary with argument congruency, and the affective content of their 
responses was instead related to ratings of the arguments. 
Keeping in mind that participants’ ratings of arguments are confounded with their 
prior attitudes, these results still suggest that individuals are capable of processing 
arguments with sensitivity to their quality despite maintaining a preference for those 
arguments congruent with individual attitudes. As in Study 1, the quality and the quantity 
of information modeled belief change, which suggests that an information-processing 
account of attitude change is appropriate even in the presence of controversial issues. 
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Chapter 3 
The role of affective involvement and knowledge in processing 
mixed evidence for social issues 
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Chapter 3, in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears in Proceedings of the 
39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Bardolph, Megan; Coulson, 
Seana. The dissertation author was the primary investigator and author of this paper. 
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Chapter 4 
The effects of information choice and rating bias on attitude 
change 
 
The preceding chapters examined how individuals process varying amounts of 
evidence that either supports or contradicts their prior attitudes. In these studies, 
participants were presented with information in the context of an online survey where 
their compliance with instructions appeared to be high: participants’ text in response to 
reading arguments nearly always indicated they had read and thought about the 
information presented. This context did not allow participants the option of ignoring 
information or selecting which arguments to read. The present study addressed attitude 
change in the context of participant choice, allowing some participants to select 
information to read from a list of available arguments; it also directly compared the 
choice vs. no choice contexts by employing a yoked design in which a second group of 
participants viewed the same information as those in the choice condition, allowing for 
the effects of choice to be separated from the effects of simply viewing and rating 
arguments. 
After the introduction of the cognitive dissonance framework (Festinger, 1957), 
many studies investigated how individuals selectively choose to read or otherwise 
expose themselves to new information in light of their personal decisions, attitudes, or 
behaviors. A meta-analysis of studies where participants reported prior attitudes and 
then selected information to view found that the phenomenon of congeniality bias was, 
although small, robust (Hart et al., 2009). Congeniality bias is defined as selection of a 
greater proportion of attitude congruent information. Hart and colleagues (2009) 
additionally found that this congeniality bias was larger when information available for 
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selection was higher in quality and when individuals were more committed to their initial 
attitudes or beliefs. 
In a prior study of information choice, Taber and Lodge (2006) allowed 
participants to choose text arguments to read from political interest groups regarding 
either affirmative action or gun control. Participants first viewed eight total arguments for 
one issue and were allowed to choose how many of those arguments to read from each 
labeled source. In the second part of the experiment, participants viewed four Pro and 
four Con arguments for the second issue. For both issues, participants rated each 
argument’s strength using a slider bar. The authors found a rating bias, where 
participants rated arguments compatible with their prior attitudes as stronger than 
incompatible arguments. They also found that participants chose to read more 
compatible arguments when given a choice, especially those with higher political 
sophistication. Participants polarized in both tasks (choice and balanced information). In 
both tasks, polarization was driven by participants with extreme prior attitudes and those 
with high political sophistication, with participants low on these measures failing to 
polarize. Polarization was further driven by bias in favor of pro-attitudinal (congruent) 
arguments in the information board task and biased argument rating in the balanced 
information task, with the least biased participants in both tasks failing to show 
polarization. 
Because studies in the preceding chapters showed evidence of the attitude 
congruency bias without attitude polarization, we wanted to test whether information 
choice could produce attitude polarization. We believe that the quantity of information 
viewed by participants is an important factor in attitude change, with more evidence in 
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favor of a position predicting attitude change toward that position. If participants are able 
to skew the proportion of arguments that they read in favor of a pre-existing attitude, 
they may polarize in response to biased information. However, we do not know if choice 
itself is important for driving this polarization; some studies indicate that polarization is a 
consequence of mixed evidence combined with extreme attitudes, biased processing of 
arguments, and high political sophistication (Taber and Lodge, 2006, Taber et al., 
2009). 
Based on the previous results (Study 1, Study 2), we expect that participants 
may show evidence of polarization if they view a greater amount of attitude-compatible 
information. This pattern should not necessarily depend on choice. If this is the case, 
then we predict that the proportion of pro-attitudinal arguments chosen will correlate 
with attitude polarization independent of whether participants chose that proportion in a 
biased manner. In a model of attitude change, proportion of Pro vs. Con arguments 
viewed should predict change in the direction of the arguments, with more change 
toward the Pro side of an issue following higher proportion of Pro arguments chosen 
and vice versa. This pattern would be found for participants who chose which 
information to view and for participants who were instead simply presented with the 
same information. 
If the proportion of pro-attitudinal arguments chosen is modeled by the 
extremeness of prior attitudes, then a motivated account of polarization is indeed 
supported. We are interested in whether there is a special role for this congeniality bias; 
that is, do participants who choose to view more information compatible with their prior 
attitudes polarize due to the act of choosing? If so, we would expect to see attitude 
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change in line with prior attitudes only for those participants who exhibit the congeniality 
bias in the choice condition. This would provide further support to accounts of motivated 
reasoning. 
The studies in prior chapters were concerned not just with the quantity of 
evidence, but also its quality. The quality of the arguments in this study was represented 
by ratings from a set of participants in a prior study, providing an independent and 
relatively objective measure. This allowed for the separation of argument quality and 
individual bias, the extent to which people rated arguments congruent with their beliefs 
as stronger than incongruent arguments beyond what would be expected due to quality 
alone. The design of this study makes it possible to see whether participants are still 
sensitive to the quality of arguments when they are able to choose which arguments to 
view. 
In the present study, the first set of participants in the Choice phase were allowed 
to select which items to read from a list of Pro and Con arguments for each issue. This 
allowed us to calculate a bias toward viewing congruent arguments in order to model its 
effect on attitude change. The second set of participants in the Matched phase were 
yoked with participants holding similar views (prior attitude and affective commitment) 
and presented with arguments chosen by these participants. This allowed us to 
separate the effects of choice from the effects of merely reading and rating a set of 
arguments. Overall, the unique design of this study makes it possible to model attitude 
change in terms of three factors of interest: proportion of arguments selected/viewed, 
objective argument quality, and individual rating bias. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Participants for Phase 1 (Choice) were 161 students (99 female) ranging in age 
from 18 to 27 years old, M=20; participants for Phase 2 (Matched) were 96 students (60 
female) between 18 and 29 years old, M=21. Students were enrolled in Psychology, 
Linguistics, or Cognitive Science courses at the University of California, San Diego 
(UCSD) participating as part of a course requirement. All participants provided informed 
consent and procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at 
UCSD. 
Materials 
The study concerned four socio-political issues: abortion, animal testing, assisted 
suicide, and the death penalty. These issues were among the most popular topics found 
on two debate websites, www.procon.org and idebate.org. 
The arguments were a subset of materials used in Study 1, consisting of 6 
supporting (Pro) and 6 opposing (Con) arguments for each of the four issues listed 
above. Attitude measurements and affective involvement measurements were 
calculated as described in Study 1. 
Procedure 
The present study comprised two separate phases that varied between 
participants: in Phase 1 (Choice), participants chose arguments to read from a list of 
Pro and Con arguments. In Phase 2 (Matched), participants’ initial Attitude and Affective 
involvement scores were used to match each Phase 2 participant with a participant from 
Phase 1 with similar scores. Phase 2 participants then viewed the same arguments in 
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the same order as the Phase 1 participant to which they were yoked. The goal of this 
yoked design was to compare argument ratings and attitude change of Phase 1 
participants who chose their own arguments to read versus Phase 2 participants with 
similar attitudes who read the exact same arguments. This design allowed us to 
examine whether the ability to choose which arguments to examine impacts the way 
participants evaluate and assimilate evidence on these topics.  
Phase 1 (Choice). As in Study 1, the experiment included three parts: initial 
collection of attitude and affective involvement measurements, the presentation and 
rating of arguments, and the subsequent collection of attitude and affective involvement 
measurements. Measurement of attitudes and affective involvement proceeded exactly 
as in Study 1. However, the procedure during the intermediate stage in which 
participants read arguments diverged somewhat from that in the previous study.  
Following the initial collection of attitude and affective involvement 
measurements, each participant was asked to read and rate arguments for three 
randomly chosen issues from the original set of four. For each of these three issues, 
participants were presented with a list of Pro and Con arguments in a labeled list 
including a topic statement for each argument (i.e., “Animal research is regulated to 
protect animals from mistreatment.”). Initially, one Pro and one Con argument were 
available. Participants selected one argument, read the full text of that argument, and 
rated it from “Weak” to “Strong” using a slider bar. Numeric values ranged from 0 to 100 
but were not visible to participants.  
After reading the first argument, the remaining unread argument and one 
additional Pro and Con argument were available from a list of arguments. An example 
 66 
screen shot from the survey is shown in Figure 4.1. This procedure continued, adding 
two additional arguments after each selected argument was viewed and rated. 
Participants thus had a total of 6 Pro and 6 Con arguments available for each issue. 
Following a randomly chosen half of the arguments, participants were instructed 
to type into a text box what they were thinking about as they rated the previous 
argument. They were allowed to advance to the next section after one minute, but could 
spend as much time as they desired typing these responses. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Screen shot showing sample participant selected arguments and list of 
available arguments for the death penalty issue. 
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After reading and rating arguments regarding all three issues, participants were 
once again asked to rate their attitudes on the four issues tested in the first stage of the 
study. Next, they completed a brief political knowledge quiz to assess their political 
sophistication and two questions to assess open-mindedness. Political sophistication 
ranged from 0 to 5 and was based on participants’ scores on the political knowledge 
quiz (i.e., number correct out of 5 items). Finally, participants read a debriefing page 
that explained the goal of the study and provided links to the websites used for the 
argument texts. 
Phase 2. As in to Phase 1, the experiment included three parts: initial collection 
of attitude and affective involvement measurements, the presentation and rating of 
arguments, and the subsequent collection of attitude and affective involvement 
measurements. The collection of attitude and affective involvement measurements 
proceeded exactly as in Phase 1; the procedure in the intermediate stage differed 
somewhat. 
Following the initial collection of attitude and affective involvement 
measurements, each participant was asked to read and rate arguments for three 
randomly chosen issues from the original set of four. For each issue, each Phase 2 
participant was matched with a participant from Phase 1. The matching process was 
done separately for each issue and involved the division of Phase 1 participants into 
four groups of approximately the same size. Division was based on scores for attitude 
(Pro or Con) and affective involvement (low or high). Participants in Phase 2 were thus 
matched with a Phase 1 participant with a similar attitude (Pro or Con) and a similar 
level of affective involvement (low or high). Phase 2 participants then viewed the exact 
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same arguments chosen by their yoked match from Phase 1. Arguments were 
presented one at a time and rated as described above from “Weak” to “Strong” with a 
slider bar.  As in Phase 1, participants were prompted to type their thoughts following 
half of the arguments.  
 As in Phase 1, after reading all of the arguments, Phase 2 participants re-rated 
their attitudes on all four original issues, completed a five-item political knowledge quiz, 
responded to two questions on open-mindedness, and read the debriefing page. 
Analysis 
Attitudes were scaled from -5 to 5, with -5 representing the opinion most opposed 
to the issue statement (e.g. “The death penalty should be banned.”) and 5 representing 
maximal agreement with the issue statement. Affective involvement ranged from 0 
(least involvement) to 5 (most involvement). Political sophistication ranged from 0 to 5. 
Items where participants spent too long reading the argument text (more than 3 
standard deviations from the mean log time, 388 seconds) were removed from the 
analysis (28 of 2848 items from Phase 1, 9 of 1700 items from Phase 2). 
 Participant variables from Phase 1 and Phase 2 were analyzed to ensure 
uniformity across experimental phase. Prior attitude and affective involvement for each 
issue were compared using linear regression models. A linear model of prior attitude as 
a function of issue and phase showed that while prior attitude varied by issue, there was 
no significant interaction of issue and phase, nor was there a significant difference 
between Phase 1 and Phase 2 prior attitude. A linear model of affective involvement 
similarly showed an effect of issue and not experimental phase. Political sophistication 
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scores were compared using a Chi-squared test with simulated p-values. Values did not 
significantly differ between Phase 1 and Phase 2 (X-squared = 4.71, p = .45). 
Models of argument rating were analyzed with a linear mixed effects regression 
(LMER) model using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, Walker, et al., 
2014; R Core Team, 2015). All experimental factors were allowed to interact initially and 
backward model selection was used to determine the best-fitting model. Accordingly, 
more complex models were compared with more parsimonious models using ANOVA in 
R. Models were fit with random intercepts and slopes for subjects and items (viz. 
arguments). The reported models are those that included statistically significant 
experimental predictors of argument rating and were not statistically different from more 
complex models (generally using cut-off p < .01, but trending predictors are also 
reported). 
Models of attitude change were analyzed with a linear model in R. Again, all 
experimental factors were allowed to interact initially; more complex models were 
compared with more parsimonious models using model ANOVA in R. This is 
approximately equivalent to selecting all predictors with a significant p value in the 
model ANOVA. 
For all models, argument polarity (Pro/Con) was sum coded. Issue 
(Abortion/Assisted suicide/Animal testing/Death penalty) was treatment coded. Abortion 
was used as a baseline for Issue because participants’ average attitude change for this 
issue was close to zero. 
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Results and Discussion 
Argument selection 
Argument selection was modeled as a function of participants’ prior attitudes to 
assess whether or not they tended to select more arguments in line with their prior 
attitudes, that is, whether they exhibited a congeniality bias. 
To appropriately model the proportion variable, a GLM with a binomial function 
was used to predict the number of Pro and Con arguments selected (modeled as 
successes and failures). A model ANOVA with a Chi-squared test was used to test the 
fit of each model. AIC comparison showed that a model with categorical position was 
not significantly different from a model with continuous prior attitude. A model allowing 
position to interact with affective involvement and political sophistication failed to reveal 
effects of either variable, or significant interactions with prior attitude. The best model 
predicting argument selection is shown in Equation 4.1: 
 
Frequency(Pro), Frequency(Con) ~ Prior attitude (4.1) 
 
Overall, participants chose to read slightly more arguments that were consistent 
with their initial attitudes. Participants selected 52% congruent and 48% incongruent 
arguments on average. This proportion is displayed in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: Pie chart showing proportion of congruent (pink) and incongruent (black) 
arguments selected by participants for each issue. 
 
The pattern of argument selection was in line with prior studies (Taber & Lodge, 
2006), albeit with a weaker congeniality bias. Besides the weaker bias toward attitude 
congruent arguments, the present study diverged from Taber and Lodge (2006) in that 
our participants’ argument choice was not modulated by political sophistication or by 
affective involvement. One potential reason for this discrepancy is the source of the 
arguments. Participants in the present study were told that arguments came from online 
debate sites, whereas participants in Taber & Lodge (2006) could see that arguments 
were from potentially polarizing interest groups such as the NRA, Brady Anti-Handgun 
Coalition, and the platforms of American political parties. It is also possible that because 
students were aware they were participating in a Psychology or Cognitive science 
experiment, they made an effort to behave in line with researchers’ imagined 
expectations (see Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989 for a discussion of accuracy 
motivation). In an optional feedback question, some students responded that they 
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specifically sought out counterarguments in order to improve their understanding of an 
issue. 
In sum, Phase 1 participants displayed a weak congeniality bias, in line with 
accounts of motivated reasoning. It is notable that this bias emerged even in an 
educated sample of students participating in an experiment pool of social science 
studies. These findings are mostly in line with a meta-analysis of the congeniality bias 
(Hart et al., 2009), which found a reduced bias for participants with greater motivation 
for accuracy and with higher open-mindedness. 
Argument rating 
Based on the results of Study 1 and Study 2, as well as prior research (Edwards 
& Smith, 1996; Taber et al., 2009), participants were expected to show an argument 
rating bias, rating attitude congruent arguments as stronger than incongruent 
arguments. This tendency could potentially vary depending on whether participants 
were able to select which arguments to view. 
To test for the presence of an argument rating bias and to assess the effects of 
choice, we modeled participants’ argument ratings with a linear mixed effects model 
with predictors of experimental phase (Choice/Matched), argument polarity (Pro or 
Con), prior attitude, affective involvement, issue, and political sophistication. Model 
selection resulted in Equation 4.2. Argument rating was predicted by a 3-way interaction 
of Prior attitude, Argument polarity, and affective involvement, with the slope of the Prior 
attitude x Argument polarity interaction being steeper for participants with high affective 
involvement, as shown in Figure 4.3. Allowing the model to further interact with Phase 
did not significantly improve the model (X2 [8, N = 4511] = 11.21, p = .19). 
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 Rating ~ Prior attitude x Argument polarity x Affective involvement (4.2) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Average argument rating as a function of prior attitude (-5 most opposed, 5 
most in favor of the position statement). Green lines represent Pro arguments. Red lines 
represent Con arguments. Ratings for participants with low and high Affective 
involvement (0 to 4.5, 4.5 to 9) are shown on the left and right respectively. 
 
 
Table 4.1. Model results for Equation 4.2 
 
Factor Estimate Std. Error df t-value p-value 
Intercept 58.749 1.727  34.01  < 0.001 
Prior attitude -0.444 0.491 1 -0.91 0.365 
Argument polarity -0.194 1.635 1 -0.12 0.906 
Affective involvement -0.103 0.230 1 -0.45 0.654 
Prior attitude x Argument polarity 1.104 0.525 1 2.10 0.036 
Prior attitude x Affective involvement 0.062 0.076 1 0.82 0.414 
Argument polarity x Affective 
involvement 0.310 0.224 
 
1 1.39 0.166 
Prior attitude x Argument polarity x 
Affective involvement 0.263 0.081 
 
1 3.25 0.001 
 
Argument ratings in the present study were thus sensitive to the same factors as 
in Study 1 and Study 2 in displaying an attitude congruency bias. Participants on the 
Pro side of an issue rated Pro arguments higher than Con arguments, and those on the 
Con side rated Con arguments higher than Pro arguments. As in our previous studies, 
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this attitude congruency bias was largest for the participants with the most extreme 
positions. The present study also revealed a further interaction with affective 
involvement that results because these attitude congruency biases were greater among 
participants who reported feeling more strongly about the issues. The latter finding was 
present as a non-significant trend in the previous studies, and may be evident here 
because the pooling of Phase 1 and Phase 2 participants yielded a more powerful 
design. 
The fact that the model was not improved by Phase suggests that argument 
ratings were affected by similar factors when participants chose which arguments to 
view as when the arguments a given participant viewed were selected by the computer. 
In both cases participants displayed an attitude congruency bias, preferring arguments 
that bolstered their own attitudes over those that undermined them. This suggests that 
the cognitive processes that underlie attitude congruency effects operate similarly when 
participants are confronted with information presented by others and when they actively 
seek out information themselves. 
Attitude change 
Attitude change was first modeled with all experimental data, then separately for 
the Choice phase and the Matched phase. The corrections and calculations described 
below were performed separately for each dataset.  
As in the preceding studies, there was an overall regression toward the mean in 
the post-treatment attitude measurements. As in Study 1 and Study 2, we determined a 
correction factor by using participants' initial attitude measurements to predict their 
attitude change at the end of the survey. This average slope, calculated only for 
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measurements where the participants did not read arguments, was subtracted from the 
data to be analyzed, effectively correcting for regression to the mean. Because the 
Post-survey attitude / Prior attitude slope differed by Issue, this calculation was 
performed separately for each issue. Analyses below all use these corrected values for 
post-treatment attitude scores. 
As in Study 3, an objective argument rating was calculated for each argument by 
averaging participants’ ratings from Study 1 and Study 2. These values were then used 
in the computation of an Argument quality score intended to convey the relative quality 
of the Pro arguments a given participant viewed compared to that of the Con arguments 
they viewed. Argument quality was thus calculated by taking the average objective 
rating of Pro arguments each participant viewed minus the average objective rating of 
their Con arguments. Positive values reflect higher quality Pro arguments, on average, 
than Con arguments, while negative values reflect higher quality Con arguments. 
Importantly, Argument quality does not reflect the number of Pro versus Con arguments 
that participants viewed. The latter was reflected in a separate variable so that we could 
dissociate the impact of the quantity of Pro arguments a given participant viewed from 
the quality of the arguments viewed.  
Rating bias was calculated as the residual rating of Pro arguments (average 
participant rating for Pro arguments – Argument quality for Pro arguments) minus the 
residual rating of Con arguments (average participant rating – Argument quality), and 
reflects the extent to which participants rated arguments differently than expected. That 
is, a positive value reflects bias in favor of Pro arguments and a negative value reflects 
bias in favor of Con arguments. This value does not reflect the number of arguments 
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participants chose. Because this value could not be calculated for issues where 
participants selected either all 6 Pro arguments or all 6 Con arguments, 22 out of 483 
items were excluded from this analysis. 
To compare overall rating bias, argument quality, and attitude change values 
across experimental phase, t-tests were performed on these variables for participants in 
Phase 1 and Phase 2. None of the tests revealed significant differences between 
groups. 
The question of interest concerns the effects on Attitude change of three main 
predictive variables: the proportion of arguments participants either chose or were 
assigned to view, the objective quality of the arguments viewed, and participants’ rating 
bias. 
According to a Bayesian account of information processing, both the quality and 
the quantity of information should contribute to attitude change in the direction of the 
evidence. When participants view more arguments in favor of a position, they will 
change their attitudes in the direction of the evidence, especially for high quality 
arguments. This means that the proportion of Pro vs. Con arguments should be related 
to attitude change. If higher quality arguments are more persuasive, then we should 
also see an effect of Argument quality. Because higher positive values reflect an overall 
higher quality of Pro arguments seen, positive Argument quality scores would be 
expected to attitude change values that are more positive (toward the Pro side), while 
negative Argument quality values should lead to attitude change scores which are more 
negative more negative (toward the Con side).  
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According to motivated accounts of information processing, both the congeniality 
bias (the tendency to choose belief-congruent arguments) and biased argument rating 
predict attitude change in the direction of one’s prior attitude. Under this account, we 
should see that Bias predicts attitude change, with positive bias (toward Pro arguments) 
leading to attitude change toward the Pro side of an issue and negative bias (toward 
Con arguments) leading to attitude change toward the Con side. The congeniality bias 
should not necessarily interact with this factor, but may contribute an independent effect 
similar to the effect described above. That is, exposure to more pro-attitude information 
leading to “polarizing” is predicted under both motivated and Bayesian accounts. 
To assess the effects of these three variables on attitude change, first all three 
predictors as well as issue were allowed to interact in a linear model of attitude change. 
A Phase variable was also allowed to interact with these predictors. Backward model 
comparison was used to select the best model predicting attitude change. This model is 
shown in Equation 4.3 and reflects all predictors with p < .03. 
 
Attitude change ~ Argument proportion x Phase + Objective quality x Phase + 
Rating bias + Argument proportion + Issue (4.3) 
 
 Because Phase interacted with predictors of interest, attitude change was 
modeled separately for Phase 1 (Choice) and Phase 2 (Matched) data, as described in 
more detail below. 
Choice phase 
 A linear regression model was created to predict attitude change in the Choice 
phase from Argument proportion, Objective quality, Rating bias, and Issue. Affective 
involvement and political sophistication were allowed to interact with each independent 
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predictor to determine whether these effects were modulated by participants’ individual 
“motive and opportunity” to further reason in favor of or against the arguments, and to 
determine whether the effects of argument quality or bias varied by issue. Neither factor 
reached significance, either alone or as part of an interaction. The initial additive model 
is shown in Equation 4.4, with results shown in Table 4.2. 
 Attitude change ~ Argument proportion + Objective quality + Rating bias 
 + Issue (4.4) 
 
Table 4.2. Model results for Choice phase, Equation 4.4 
 
Factor Estimate Std. Error df t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.253 0.112  -2.25 .025 
Argument proportion 0.152 0.054 1 2.83 < .005 
Objective quality -0.063 0.102 1 -0.62 .538 
Rating bias 0.324 0.044 1 7.39  < .001 
Issue   3   
(Assisted suicide) 0.574 0.124  4.62 < .001 
(Animal testing) 0.289 0.140  2.07 .039 
(Death penalty) 0.169 0.253  0.67 .505 
 
Matched phase 
 As above, a linear regression model was created to predict attitude change in the 
Matched phase from Argument proportion, Objective quality, Rating bias, and Issue. 
Affective involvement and political sophistication were again allowed to interact with 
each independent predictor. Neither factor reached significance, either alone or as part 
of an interaction. The initial additive model is shown above in Equation 4.4. Because 
none of the individual issues reached significance, Issue was removed as a predictor in 
the model. The revised additive model is shown in Equation 4.5. Results are shown in 
Table 4.3. 
 Attitude change ~ Argument proportion + Objective quality + Rating bias (4.5) 
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Table 4.3. Model results for Matched phase, Equation 4.5 
 
Factor Estimate Std. Error df t-value p-value 
Intercept 0.000 0.059  0.00 1.000 
Argument proportion -0.025 0.060 1 -0.42 .674 
Objective quality 0.159 0.060 1 2.67 .008 
Rating bias 0.177 0.060 1 2.94 .004 
 
The attitude change results for the Choice phase support a motivated account, 
where participants’ attitude change depends on the proportion of arguments selected 
and participants’ bias toward one side of an issue. The proportion of arguments viewed 
did not contribute to measures of attitude change in the Matched phase, indicating that 
perhaps the act of choosing arguments in a biased fashion sets off biased processing 
that can lead to attitude change in line with one’s prior attitudes. Studies 1 and 2 
showed that attitude change is sensitive to the amount of evidence presented, so it may 
seem surprising that argument proportion was not a significant predictor of change in 
the Matched phase. However, participants’ tendency to select a greater proportion of 
congruent arguments was very small in this study, meaning that individuals in the 
Matched phase on average viewed an even number of Pro and Con arguments or only 
one additional attitude congruent argument due to this bias. 
In both the Choice and the Matched phase, participants’ argument rating bias 
modeled attitude change in the direction of the bias: a bias toward Pro arguments 
models change toward the Pro position of an issue and vice versa for a Con argument 
bias. This is again in line with a motivated account of attitude change and is similar to 
the findings of Study 3. 
Also similar the findings of Study 3, objective argument quality modeled attitude 
change for participants in the Matched phase. This is an important finding within the 
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unique yoked paradigm: participants were sensitive to the quality of arguments when 
they did not select which arguments to view, whereas those participants who selected 
their own arguments did not appear sensitive to the quality of those arguments. This 
does point to a special role for information choice, possibly leading to motivated 
reasoning in this scenario vs. more rational reasoning when participants do not choose 
which content to view. 
Further work could explore the underlying cognitive processes at work during 
selective information exposure. It could be that participants choose familiar content that 
only serves to reinforce their existing attitudes, meaning that quality matters less 
because there is less new information being consumed. Alternatively or in addition to 
this process, participants may form an initial judgment of incompatible arguments based 
only on a small summary and then not process the text as thoroughly as they would if it 
were presented without participant choice. 
The emergence of bias in response to information choice indicates a potential 
important difference between situations in which people are presented with a curated 
collection of information vs. situations where people choose what information they 
would like to consume. The mere act of choosing content, perhaps by selecting news 
articles according to their headlines or listening to only certain radio or television shows, 
can reinforce a belief in one’s own attitudes, enhancing the potential for individual 
polarization for controversial issues. 
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Chapter 5  
Summary 
 
This series of experiments presented participants with arguments pertaining to 
controversial socio-political issues. The quantity of information was varied so that 
sometimes participants viewed one-sided evidence, either all congruent or incongruent 
with their initial attitudes on the issue; and sometimes they viewed a mix of supporting 
and disconfirming evidence. This allowed us to test the effects of the quantity of 
information on attitude change. 
Participants were asked to rate each argument on its strength, providing a 
preliminary estimate of argument quality in the first two studies. Argument ratings 
showed an attitude congruency bias, where congruent arguments were rated more 
highly. Because this rating measure was confounded with bias, Chapters 3 and 4 
utilized ratings from the prior studies to create a more precise estimate of objective 
argument quality and rating bias to separate these individual effects on attitude change. 
In each study, we tested for the effects of affective involvement (how much 
participants cared about and had thought about an issue) and political sophistication on 
measures of bias and on attitude change. Political sophistication did not appear to play 
a role in these processes, and affective commitment emerged only as a predictor of a 
stronger argument rating bias for those participants who reported greater commitment 
to an issue. In Chapter 3, we explored the role of knowledge in attitude but were unable 
to find evidence of a significant relationship. 
In Chapter 4, we explored a new yoked paradigm, allowing one set of 
participants to choose which information to view. In this Choice phase, we were able to 
test for the presence of a congeniality bias, where participants choose to view 
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information congruent with their attitudes. By yoking a second set of participants to the 
first based on their similarity in attitudes and affective involvement, we separated out the 
effects of information choice on biased evidence processing. 
Chapter 1 
Participants viewed a combination of mixed and one-sided evidence for six socio-
political issues, rating individual arguments on how weak or strong they were. 
Participants’ attitudes toward each issue and affective involvement were measured at 
the beginning of the experimental survey, and their attitudes were measured again after 
viewing all information. 
We found evidence of an attitude congruency bias, where ratings depended on 
participants’ initial attitudes and argument polarity: arguments congruent with initial 
attitudes were rated as stronger than incongruent arguments. We next tested for the 
presence of polarization, a measure of participants’ beliefs moving toward the extremes 
of the rating scale for an issue. Polarization appeared to emerge only in response to 
congruent arguments, whereas de-polarization (a trend toward the center of the rating 
scale) emerged in the presence of highly-rated incongruent arguments. Because this 
pattern did not match accounts of motivated reasoning, we measured attitude change 
toward the Pro or Con position of an issue instead. 
We found that participants’ attitudes changed in response to highly-rated 
arguments regardless of their congruency with prior attitudes. Attitude change was also 
related to experimental condition (Pro, Con, or Mixed evidence), with a greater quantity 
of Pro arguments leading to change in participants’ attitudes toward the Pro position, 
Con arguments leading to change toward the Con position, and Mix leading to little 
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overall change, but eliciting enhanced de-polarization. Because biased processing of 
evidence in the form of an argument rating bias did not appear to lead to polarizing, we 
concluded that the attitude change better supported a Bayesian account of belief 
revision: information is judged in terms of its perceived quality, but overall participants 
are sensitive to the amount and direction of information, updating their attitudes in the 
direction of the information viewed. 
Chapter 2 
The paradigm of this study was similar to that of the Chapter 1 experiment, with 
participants viewing mixed and one-sided evidence for a subset of the original issues. 
To examine the effects of active arguing on attitude change, to assess whether 
participants spent more time arguing against incongruent arguments, and to examine 
whether positive or negative statements accompanied congruent/incongruent 
arguments, we added participant text response to this study. 
We replicated the attitude congruency bias found in Chapter 1 as well as the 
attitude change behavior, with participants again showing sensitivity to the quantity and 
quality of information instead of displaying polarizing in response to highly rated 
congruent arguments. We did not find evidence of a disconfirmation bias, where 
participants spend more time reading incongruent arguments. We also did not find that 
participants generated more bolstering statements (positive sentiment) in response to 
congruent arguments or denigrating statements (negative sentiment) in response to 
incongruent arguments. Instead, we found that sentiment varied with argument rating, 
with more positive sentiment following highly-rated arguments, regardless of their 
congruency with prior attitudes. Taken together, these results further support a 
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Bayesian account of information processing in which the quality of evidence (and its 
direction) matters more than its interaction with people’s attitudes. 
Some questions still remain after these two studies: Why do these results differ 
from those showing that the most biased, politically sophisticated participants polarize in 
response to mixed evidence? Do people treat information differently because they have 
stronger vs. weaker feelings about an issue or because they have different amounts of 
knowledge about the topic? And to what extent does argument rating reflect individual 
bias vs. the underlying quality of the information? 
The participants in these studies are an educated group of undergraduate 
students at a top research university who are aware that they are participating in 
psychology-related experiments. Compared to political science students, these 
participants may be less motivated to argue and more motivated to pursue accuracy in 
their judgments and more open to attitude change. If the nature of the experiment leads 
more objective processing, this could point toward the importance of encouraging 
thoughtful consideration of new information. 
To address the questions of the role of affect vs. knowledge and the effects of 
argument quality vs. individual bias, Chapter 3 specifically measures participants’ 
knowledge for two of the issues in these experiments, and Chapters 3 and 4 explore the 
role of specific biases calculated in a new manner. Results at the end of Chapter 2 
suggest that attitude change following highly-rated arguments may be partially due to 
the arguments’ objective quality, but also due to individual bias driven by extant 
attitudes. 
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Chapter 3 
In this study, participants viewed and rated only mixed evidence for one of two 
issues: animal testing and the death penalty. Their topic knowledge was measured for 
both issues, as well as their affective involvement and other measures the same as in 
the previous studies. To form a measure of objective argument rating, ratings from 
participants in Studies 1 and 2 were combined and averaged to obtain an average 
rating for each argument. These objective values were subtracted from participants’ 
ratings in Study 3 to obtain a new measure, rating bias, which measured the extent to 
which participants rated arguments differently than what would otherwise be expected 
based on quality. This more sensitive measurement of bias was predictive of attitude 
change, showing biased processing leading to attitude change in the direction of the 
bias for the first time in this series of experiments. Along with bias, objective argument 
quality was also predictive of attitude change, again showing that participants were 
sensitive to this variable independent of their own attitudes. 
Neither affective involvement nor topic knowledge appeared to play a significant 
role in either biased processing of arguments or attitude change. There was a 
relationship between affective involvement and the argument rating bias, but this did not 
further affect attitude change. Overall, results pointed toward a role of bias in attitude 
change, but also supported Bayesian information processing, indicating that some 
elements of both may be present. This study used materials from two issues where 
participants were overall very balanced in their views and may have been more 
receptive to changing their attitudes. Each participant also received only mixed 
evidence, which could further encourage sensitivity to the merits of each argument. As 
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seen in previous studies, this pool of participants seems to exhibit consideration of the 
information and does not tend to argue strongly against incongruent argument. 
In an effort to elicit stronger potential effects of bias, Chapter 4 allows some 
participants to choose which arguments to read, giving them an opportunity to favor 
congruent arguments, which may set off further biased processing of evidence. 
Chapter 4 
This study comprised two phases: the Choice phase, where each participant was 
able to choose arguments to read from a set of labeled Pro and Con items, and the 
Matched phase, where each participant received a set of arguments to read from a 
matched Choice phase participant. This allowed us to test for the presence of a 
congeniality bias, a tendency to choose attitude-congruent arguments, in the Choice 
phase, and examine its potential effects on argument rating and attitude change. It also 
allowed us to test whether the act of choice enhances other biases by comparing the 
behavior participants in the Choice phase to those in the Matched phase. 
We found evidence of a small but significant congeniality bias, with participants 
choosing slightly more congruent arguments to read when given a choice. This bias was 
modeled by participants’ attitudes, but not their affective involvement. We replicated the 
attitude congruency bias from prior studies, where participants rate congruent 
arguments as stronger. This bias did not differ by experiment phase, indicating that it 
was not sensitive to participants’ argument choice. 
The rating bias variable significantly modeled attitude change for both phases, 
indicating that participants’ biased treatment of evidence led to attitude change in line 
with their preference for Pro or Con arguments separate from their quality. The 
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proportion of Pro vs. Con arguments chosen affected attitude change only for the 
Choice condition, indicating that the act of choice itself may elicit an additional bias not 
captured by other measures. Both of these findings support a motivated account of 
attitude change. 
As in Chapter 3, objective argument quality and argument rating bias were 
calculated as separate predictive factors of attitude change. Objective quality modeled 
attitude change in the Matched phase only, in line with the results of Study 3. The fact 
that objective quality did not reach significance for data in the Choice condition suggests 
that different cognitive processes are at work; individuals may be less sensitive to 
evidence in the presence of choice because they have already made a judgment in the 
act of choosing. 
These findings are important especially in view of the current political climate in 
the United States and elsewhere, where polarization appears to be on the rise and 
individuals have more information available for consumption than ever before. The 
potential to choose one’s own information for any topic, especially controversial social 
and political issues, may have significant drawbacks if the process of choice 
exacerbates divides between groups on opposing sides. It is difficult to imagine how 
individuals might agree on which information is high in quality and decide to view an 
appropriate mix of content that is congruent and incongruent with pre-existing attitudes. 
Individual choice seems to influence whether people process information in a motivated 
or information-processing fashion, showing that rationality may be elusive when 
individuals choose their own content. 
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